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Introduction 
Most readers probably paid little attention to the small entry in a local New 
Mexico newspaper on December 28, 2013: “Uranium project on Navajo Nation gets 
green light.”1  According to the article, Navajo lawmakers voted to grant a mining 
company permission to operate a “demonstration uranium recovery project” on 
lands within the Church Rock chapter of the Navajo Nation, east of Gallup, despite 
the existence of tribal laws banning uranium mining or processing within “Navajo 
Indian Country” and regulating the transport of radioactive substances across the 
reservation.2  The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NCR) licensed the project 
on lands owned by Uranium Resources, Inc. (URI), a company formerly known as 
Hydro-Resources, Inc.  The site is located within the external boundaries of the 
Navajo Nation and is populated by members of the Navajo Nation.  In fact, to 
access the mineral estate, URI must cross lands owned by the Navajo Nation, 
which entails recognition of a “right of way” in URI.  Although the Navajo Nation 
Council recently invalidated the subcommittee’s approval of the project, the story 
is significant because it exemplifies the linkages between past, present, and future 
radioactive contamination on the Navajo Nation.3  In that sense, the case 
illustrates the theme of this article: the legacy of radioactive contamination 
continues for the Navajo Nation and for many other Native peoples. 
Church Rock, New Mexico, is already one of the most highly contaminated areas 
in the country due to the abandoned mines at Northeast Church Rock and Quivira, 
which house some of the largest piles of radioactive tailings in the world.4  As 
documented by the U.S. Government Accountability Office in its recent report (the 
“GAO Report”), there are over 500 abandoned uranium mines on the Navajo 
Nation, including the ones at Church Rock, which left a poisonous legacy for the 
Navajo people, including many highly toxic sites for remediation.5  However, 
 
1. Noel Lyn Smith, Uranium Project on Navajo Nation Gets Green Light, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL 
THE DAILY TIMES (Dec. 28, 2013, 12:05 AM), http://www.abqjournal.com/327733/news/uranium-
project-on-navajo-nation-gets-green-light.html. 
2.    See Alastair Lee Bitsoi, Despite Tsosie’s Pleas, Council votes against URI subcommittee, NAVAJO 
TIMES, July 24, 2014, at A1-A3 (citing the 2005 Dine Natural Resources Protection Act, the 2012 
Radioactive Materials Transportation Act, and a “Temporary Access agreement between the tribe 
and URI in which the uranium company agreed to cleanup waste” on lands in and near Church 
Rock before mining continues). 
3.   Id. (noting that the Navajo Nation Department of Justice issued a legal opinion finding that the 
project would violate Navajo Nation law, and that the other members of the Navajo Nation 
Council voted to terminate the subcommittee). 
4.    See Brandon Loomis, Uranium Mine Cleanup on the Navajo Reservation Could Take 100 Years, 
ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Aug. 6, 2014, at A1 [hereinafter Loomis, Uranium Mine Cleanup]. 
5. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-12-323, Uranium Contamination; Overall Scope, Time 
Frame and Cost Information Is Need for Contamination Cleanup on the Navajo Reservation 
(2014) [hereinafter GAO Report]. See also Bindu Panikkar & Doug Brugge, The Ethical Issues in 
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remediation poses a daunting challenge because the radioactive contamination on 
the Navajo Nation is quite far-reaching and insidious due to the life cycle of the 
mining and milling process.6  The health hazards of environmental radiation can 
be attributed to abandoned mines, to the piles of mill tailings that represent the 
waste from mining, and to the radon particles that infuse the air and often the 
homes where many Navajo people reside.7  Unlike similar sites on state and 
federal public lands, Church Rock is the permanent home of a population that is 
97% Navajo and includes many women of child-bearing age and children.  The 
Navajo residents have family ties that trace back generations.  In the traditional 
way, they are part of the land.  Their umbilical cords might be buried there, as are 
those of their parents and grandparents.8  For this reason, many families will not 
move, even though the documented levels of exposure are in many cases 
significantly higher than the scientific literature deems “safe.”  In addition, many 
residents continue to practice a traditional subsistence economy, which includes 
grazing livestock.  They subsist on these animals, which also drink the water and 
breathe the air.  The lands are within a windy part of the Southwest, and the wind 
kicks up dust.  It is impossible to avoid exposure to the tailings, which emit radon-
222, a known carcinogen.  The only question is whether there is any “safe” way to 
maintain the human community of Church Rock or analogous communities on the 
Navajo Nation and elsewhere, given the fact that the intended “remediation” is far 
from complete and there are plans to open new mines in areas that have 
documented reserves of uranium. 
The historic mining activities on the Navajo Nation triggered a plethora of 
litigation, including cases seeking damages for the health impacts to Navajo 
miners and for the 1979 Church Rock spill of contaminated water into the Rio 
Puerco, as well as the on-going Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) action to clean up the most toxic sites.9  
 
Uranium Mining Research in the Navajo Nation, 14 ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESEARCH 121, 137-38 
(2007) (describing the findings of environmental monitoring projects in Church Rock, which led 
the Navajo Nation and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to issue a Superfund 
enforcement order). 
6. See Barbara Rose Johnston, Susan Dawson & Gary Madsen, Uranium Mining and Milling: 
Navajo Experiences in the American Southwest, in INDIANS AND ENERGY: EXPLOITATION AND 
OPPORTUNITY IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 111, 117 (Sherry Smith & Brian Frehner eds., 2010) 
(noting that ”the nuclear fuel cycle involves four different industrial processes: mining, milling 
(producing uranium oxides commonly called yellowcake), enrichment and fuel fabrication”). 
7. See JUDY PASTERNAK, YELLOW DIRT: AN AMERICAN STORY OF A POISONED LAND AND A PEOPLE 
BETRAYED 146 (2010). 
8. Id. at 238 (quoting testimony of Navajo Council Delegate George Arthur). 
9. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 USC §§ 9601-
9675 (2006) [hereinafter CERCLA] (establishing the authority and processes necessary to 
remediate contamination from past activities that have endangered or will endanger public 
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The focus of these cases is to determine who is legally responsible for paying for the 
harms of radioactive contamination.  Liability is defined by principles of Anglo-
American tort law, as well as the complex web of federal statutes authorizing 
recovery for human victims of radioactive contamination.10  This regime intersects 
with the equally complicated set of environmental statutes that covers mining 
reclamation, and recovery for toxic and hazardous releases that harm land and 
natural resources.11  Unfortunately, the structures governing liability do not 
compensate the Indigenous peoples for the cultural harms to their traditional 
lands and livelihoods, which are intertwined with their identity as a separate 
people.12  In that sense, the existing federal law lacks any capacity to provide 
redress for a set of wrongs that is part of a broader history of injustice for 
Indigenous peoples.  This history of injustice has inspired an active dialogue within 
human rights circles, and it is also the inspiration for Indigenous lawmakers, as 
they exert political and cultural sovereignty over their lands in the exercise of their 
right to self-determination, which was recognized by the 2007 United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.13  
The exercise of self-determination is necessary to redress the legacy of the 19th 
century federal policy of treating Indian nations as “wards” of the United States, 
which enabled the U.S. as “trustee” to lease tribal lands to non-Indian corporations 
for mining and other forms of development.14  Within this model, tribal lands 
served as “resource colonies” for the use of the United States.  The legacy of this 
history has been profound contamination of land and water resources.  In 2005, 
Navajo lawmakers responded by enacting legislation banning uranium mining on 
any site within “the Navajo Indian country,” specifically acknowledging the 
devastating history of exploitation that resulted in the contamination of land and 
 
health). 
10. See, e.g., Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1990, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 et seq. 
(2000), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-106publ245/html/PLAW-106publ 
245.htm [hereinafter RECA]. 
11. See, e.g., Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3021, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7901 et 
seq [hereinafter UMTRCA]. See generally JEFFREY C. MILLER & CRAIG N. JOHNSTON, THE LAW OF 
HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL AND REMEDIATION (1996). 
12. See In re Exxon Valdez: Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp., 104 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(upholding finding of district court that Alaska Native claimants could not recover damages for 
loss of their subsistence lifeways because these are “non-economic” injuries, and because culture 
exists “in the mind and the heart” of an individual). See also Rebecca Tsosie, Cultural Challenges 
to Biotechnology: Native American Genetic Resources and the Concept of Cultural Harm, 35 J. 
LAW, MED. & ETHICS 396, 405 (2007). 
13. U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 
(Oct. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Declaration].   
14. See Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The Role of 
Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 227, 301-02 (1996) 
[hereinafter Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy]. 
 Indigenous Peoples and the Ethics of Remediation 
207 
water, as well as the loss of lives of Navajo people who worked in the uranium 
mines.15  The Navajo Nation’s then-President, Joe Shirley, noted the active 
involvement of the United States in promoting uranium mining on the Navajo 
Nation and equated this with a practice of “genocide” against the Navajo people.16  
Given this 2005 legislation and President Shirley’s strong statement, why did 
Navajo legislators vote in 2013 to grant permission to a non-Indian corporation to 
mine uranium in an area inhabited by tribal members?  Why did the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission license URI to operate a “demonstration uranium recovery 
project” on these lands?  What is the role of the Environmental Protection Agency 
in remediation of past harm or authorization of new forms of mining?  How is the 
health of tribal members affected by these policies?  How does the history of the 
Church Rock Chapter inform the current issue, or does it?  Given the support of 
certain Navajo Nation policymakers and allotted landowners for economic 
development, including uranium mining, what human rights or civil rights might 
be violated if the project were to move forward?  Does the experience of the Church 
Rock chapter evoke a “reparative justice” issue for “past” harm or an 
“environmental justice” issue within the contemporary politics of energy 
development?  
This paper will discuss these and related issues within a comparative 
framework that engages the idea of building an “ethics of remediation” for the 
radioactive contamination of Indigenous peoples and lands.  U.S. Congressman 
Henry Waxman was the Chairman of the House Oversight and Governmental 
Reform Committee which conducted the 2007 hearings that paved the way for a 
five-year plan for federal cooperation on clean up of the radioactive contamination 
on the Navajo Nation.17  Waxman asserted that there is a “moral responsibility for 
the federal government to find responsible parties for cleanup or to do the work 
ourselves.”18  The comment serves as a springboard for the argument that I want 
to make.  Our existing legal system requires identification of toxic sites for 
remediation and identification of all “potentially responsible parties” who might be 
joined in a legal action to pay the costs of remediation.  On the Navajo Nation, 
there are well over 500 abandoned mines and only a few dozen can be linked to 
specific owners.19  None of the sites on the Navajo Nation is yet listed on the 
 
15. Diné Resources Protection Act, NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 18, § 1301 (2005). 
16. See Rebecca Tsosie, Climate Change, Sustainability and Globalization: Charting the Future of 
Indigenous Environmental Self-Determination, 4 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 188, 213-14 
(2009) [hereinafter Tsosie, Charting the Future]. 
17.    See Brandon Loomis, Navajo “Ghost Mines” Are Cold War’s Deadly Legacy, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, 
Aug. 10, 2014, at A21. 
18.   Id. 
19.    Loomis, Uranium Mine Cleanup, supra note 4, at A1. 
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National Priorities List under CERCLA, which would authorize recovery under the 
federal “Superfund” process.20  The Northeast Church Rock site is the initial target 
for remediation and is only in the early stages of clean-up.21  It is clear that the 
existing U.S. legal process does not accord with the moral duties that inhere in an 
“ethics of remediation.”   
In building my account of an “ethics of remediation,” I question how and why we 
authorize forms of redress for victims of radioactive contamination without 
necessarily taking account of broader justice considerations.  Many communities 
have suffered from radioactive contamination, and American servicemen have also 
been exposed at unsafe levels.22  In that respect, the paper does not argue that this 
situation is unique to Indigenous peoples.  However, the paper does argue that the 
harms of radioactive contamination are distinctive for Indigenous peoples because 
they have a different history of injustice due to their diminished political rights, 
because they reside on their lands in a different manner, and because they hold a 
different set of values about land.  Indigenous peoples, unlike other groups, 
maintain an intergenerational presence on their lands and often practice a 
“subsistence” (sustainable) economy, which is infused with an integrated set of 
cultural norms comprising a system of environmental ethics.  In addition, 
individuals who practice a subsistence economy often consume animals, fish, and 
plants from the local environment, which may be contaminated by radioactive 
waste.  In this sense, the health impacts of radioactive contamination are 
continuous and ongoing for many Indigenous communities. 
As President Shirley noted in the context of the Navajo Nation, the legacy of 
radioactive contamination can lead to cultural and even physical genocide for 
contemporary communities, if the harms are not fully engaged and redressed.  
Radioactive contamination is insidious but deadly for humans who live in close 
proximity to these sites, leading to what Navajo activist Klee Benally refers to as 
“a slow genocide of the Indigenous people” in the Southwest.23  Indigenous peoples 
live with the legacy of radioactive contamination on a daily basis.  They are 
vulnerable to radioactive contamination in ways that other communities are not.  
The historic harms of radioactive contamination are often attributed to race, 
 
20.   GAO Report, supra note 5, at 18. 
21.  Id. at 24. 
22. See generally Costandina Titus, Governmental Responsibility for Victims of Atomic Testing: A 
Chronicle of the Politics of Compensation, 8(2) J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 277 (1983); STEPHEN 
SCHWARTZ, ATOMIC AUDIT: THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS SINCE 
1940 (1998). 
23. “A Slow Genocide of the People”: Uranium Mining Leaves Toxic Nuclear Legacy on Indigenous 
Land, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.democracynow.org/2014/3/14/a_slow_ 
genocide_of_the_people (interviewing Klee Benally and Taylor McKinnon). 
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ethnicity, and diminished political rights.24  Because the U.S. now endorses a 
notion of tribal self-determination, contemporary harms to Indigenous 
communities may be masked as “the exercise of tribal sovereignty” to the extent 
that the decisions of Native lawmakers align with the commercial interests of 
energy companies.  For example, the 2013 decision by Navajo lawmakers to 
authorize URI to mine within the Navajo Nation was an act of sovereignty by a 
tribal government.  Yet, as the Navajo Nation Department of Justice later 
determined, it also conflicted with the Navajo Nation’s sovereign act of banning 
uranium mining within the reservation.  There is political disagreement among 
Navajo people about which action is in alignment with the Navajo Nation’s human 
right to “self-determination,” and the controversy is noted in the GAO Report, as 
well as by Rep. Waxman, without any attempt to assess which perspective is 
“right.”25  It is possible that the contemporary politics of radioactive contamination 
of Native peoples and lands can be attributed to ongoing social, cultural, and 
economic inequities, which could invoke human rights violations for particular 
groups within the tribe.  This is an issue for the Navajo Nation to decide, as Rep. 
Waxman noted with respect, quite sensibly determining only that “as a general 
rule . . . we ought to correct the wrongs of the past before inflicting new damage 
and we ought to ensure that mistakes of the past aren’t repeated.”26  With that 
comment in mind, it should be noted that the harms of radioactive contamination 
fall disproportionately upon Indigenous women and children, as well as upon 
community members who practice traditional, subsistence economies, which often 
include elders.  Needless to say, many of these individuals do not possess the 
political access necessary to exert political sovereignty.  Rather, they exert cultural 
forms of sovereignty, in alignment with their traditional teachings.   
This article explores the legacy of radioactive contamination for Native peoples 
by exploring the consequences of historical government policies and the way in 
which those policies are perpetuated in the present era.  Although the analysis 
could be expanded to include other groups, the paper focuses on the experience of 
the Navajo Nation in comparison to that of the Indigenous peoples of the Marshall 
Islands.  The article also engages the possibilities for remediation within the 
 
24. See Barbara Rose Johnston, Environmental Degradation and Human Rights Abuse, in WHO PAYS 
THE PRICE?: THE SOCIOCULTURAL CONTEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 7, 11 (Barbara Rose 
Johnston ed., 1994) (describing the social process of “selective victimization,” which exposes 
certain groups to hazardous environmental conditions based on cultural notions, including race 
and gender, as well as particular political histories, including colonialism). 
25.   See GAO Report, supra note 5, at 12-13; The Health and Environmental Impacts of Uranium 
Contamination in the Navajo Nation, 110th Cong. 8 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 Hearing Record] 
(statement of Rep. Harvey Waxman). 
26  2007 Hearing Record, supra note 25, at 8. 
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domestic and international frameworks of “environmental justice.”  The paper 
argues that an “ethics of remediation” requires holistic attention to the current 
environmental and public health issues, as well as to the economic and ethical 
issues that divide nations at both the domestic and international levels.  The 
politics of “war” and “peace” have driven the policy agenda of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear energy development.  As a global phenomenon, this political agenda 
reprises a dynamic of colonialism that has used Native peoples and lands in ways 
that are exploitive and destructive of their traditional economies, norms, and 
relationships.  Thus, an ethics of remediation is as much about redressing 
inequities of power, capacity, and agency, as it is about “cleaning up the 
environment.”  I will argue that Indigenous justice systems and norms ought to be 
employed in designing an “ethics of remediation.”  An intercultural approach to 
remediating the harm of radioactive contamination is necessary to achieve the 
moral objectives of reparative justice, as well as the legal obligation to redress 
tangible harms. 
Part I of the paper provides a historical account of radioactive contamination on 
tribal lands within the Navajo Nation.  This section of the paper evaluates the 
historic federal policy governing uranium extraction with current policies favoring 
economic development of energy resources on tribal lands, and explores the health 
consequences of such development.  Part II of the paper provides a comparative 
historical account of radioactive contamination in the South Pacific, examining 
how the U.S. has engaged this history in the context of its sovereign interaction 
with South Pacific Island peoples and nations.  Of course, the issue of who is 
responsible for cleaning up radioactive contamination from military operations 
during war continues to be a major, unresolved issue of international policy.27  Part 
III of the paper constructs a framework for reparative justice and compares the 
historical experience of American Indian nations and South Pacific nations to 
examine what accounts of reparative justice are operating in each of those cases.  
Are they different depending upon a designation of political status (e.g. 
“Indigenous people” or “nation”)?  Should they be different?  What political rights 
or human rights are implicated by these differences?  Part IV of the paper develops 
the framework for an “ethics of remediation” for radioactive contamination and 
explores how it might be invoked to evaluate environmental justice for affected 
peoples. 
 
27. This point was made during the conference by Professor Dinah Shelton. See Dinah Shelton, 
Whiplash and Backlash—Reflections on a Human Rights Approach to Environmental Protection, 
13 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 11 (2015). 
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I. Radioactive Contamination of Tribal Lands: A Policy History 
Radioactive contamination on American Indian reservations is a product of the 
United States’ ability to control tribal lands under its “trustee” role, as well as its 
commitment to develop nuclear energy and create nuclear weapons technology to 
enhance its military power.  The historic U.S. policy of incentivizing uranium 
production affected many reservations and adjacent lands, which resulted in 
contamination of land, water, and natural resources, including fish.  This paper 
will focus on the Navajo Nation’s experience, though it is important to acknowledge 
that many tribes have been affected, including the Pueblo Indian nations in the 
Grants mineral belt and the Indigenous nations in the Pacific Northwest, near the 
Hanford nuclear facility.28  On the Navajo Nation, private companies extracted 
approximately 4 million tons of ore from mines within the reservation from the 
1940s to 1986.29  These activities took place under two sets of policies, which form 
the historical context for an “ethics of remediation.” 
A. Uranium Production and National Security: The Public Good 
Argument   
The historic legacy of radioactive contamination for Native peoples and lands 
relates to the longstanding U.S. policy to treat uranium production as a “public 
good” intended to serve the country’s interest in national security.  In the 19th 
century, the United States government began mining uranium in this country, 
although it relied mainly on imported uranium from Canada and Africa until the 
1940s.30  In 1939, the U.S. government began preliminary exploration for uranium 
on the Navajo reservation, and in 1942, it began a classified survey of the Colorado 
Plateau, which revealed that many of the richest deposits in the country were 
located on these lands within Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico.31  The United 
States covertly mined uranium on the Navajo Reservation during World War II, 
 
28. See Tsosie, Charting the Future, supra note 16, at 208-09; Bradford D. Cooley, The Navajo 
Uranium Ban: Tribal Sovereignty v. National Energy Demands, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. 
L. 393, 417-18 (2006); Barbara Rose Johnston & Susan Dawson, Resource Use and Abuse on 
Native American Land: Uranium Mining in the American Southwest, in WHO PAYS THE PRICE?: 
THE SOCIOCULTURAL CONTEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 142, 142-43 (Barbara Rose Johnston 
ed., 1994); See Doug Brugge & Rob Goble, The History of Uranium Mining and the Navajo People, 
92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1410 (2002). 
29   GAO Report, supra note 5, at 1. 
30. See generally PETER H. EICHSTAEDT, IF YOU POISON US: URANIUM AND NATIVE AMERICANS 1–22 
(1994) (discussing history of uranium mining in the United States and Europe, including the 
transition to domestic exploration of vanadium and uranium, particularly on Indian reservations); 
Johnston, Dawson & Madsen, supra note 6, at 112-15 (discussing early history of uranium 
mining). 
31. See Tsosie, Charting the Future, supra note 16, at 218-19. 
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and, after the war ended, Congress passed the 1946 Atomic Energy Act, which 
established the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).32  In 1947, the AEC opened 
offices in Colorado, Utah, and New Mexico and offered a $10,000 discovery bonus 
for high-grade deposits of uranium.33  The Navajo people knew of the red and gold 
rocks that are associated with vanadium and uranium, and they guided U.S. 
officials to those deposits.  Active mining commenced on the Navajo Nation in the 
1940s, in mines leased to the Vanadium Corporation of America. 
Under the 1946 Atomic Energy Act, the uranium industry was controlled by the 
AEC, and all uranium had to be sold to the AEC.  The United States was the sole 
purchaser of the resource, and the justification for this monopoly was national 
security.  This meant that uranium production was treated as a public good, for the 
benefit of all Americans.  However, the harms disproportionately fell upon Navajo 
people, primarily the Navajos who worked in the mines on the reservation, as well 
as their families.34  The effects of uranium mining on human health were known 
by the 1940s and precautionary measures were available.35  However, the Navajo 
workers were not told of the hazards of uranium mining, and the companies did 
not provide any protection to the workers, who breathed the contaminated air in 
the mines and drank the contaminated water.36   
In 1949, the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) initiated a study of the health 
impacts of uranium mining on the Navajo Nation and on other lands within the 
Colorado Plateau.  By 1959, the study demonstrated a “statistically significant 
association between uranium mining and lung cancer for White miners,” and this 
result was published in medical literature in 1962.37  Although miners from other 
ethnic and racial backgrounds took part in the field study, the study focused on 
White miners, purportedly due to “a scientific desire to report on a homogeneous 
population.”38  The PHS study seems highly problematic under contemporary 
biomedical research standards applicable to human subjects.39  However, the 
 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 219. See also Johnston & Dawson, supra note 28, at 144. 
34. See Panikkar & Brugge, supra note 5, at 121-22 (claiming that there were approximately 10,000 
uranium miners in the U.S. from 1945-1988 and that approximately 3000 of those were Navajo 
men). 
35. See Brugge & Goble, supra note 28, at 1410 (noting that by 1926, studies had documented “the 
histopathology of lung cancer in miners,” and by 1932, Germany and Czechoslovakia had 
designated such cancers as a “compensable occupational disease”). 
36. In fact, the federal government did not even regulate miners’ exposure to the radioactive dust or 
require ventilation in the mines until 1967. See Alice Segal, Uranium Mining and the Navajo 
Nation: Legal Injustice, 21 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 355 (2012). 
37. See Brugge & Goble, supra note 28, at 1414. 
38. Id. 
39. See generally Joan L. McGregor, Population Genomics and Research Ethics with Socially 
Identifiable Groups, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 356 (2007) (discussing current research protections for 
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research did not violate any legal duties, according to the federal court in Begay v. 
United States, which upheld the study as “consistent with the medical, ethical, and 
legal standards of the 1940s and 1950s,” because the researchers were merely 
“observing” the subjects and there were no active “experiments” on human 
subjects.40   
Follow-up studies drew a correlation between tobacco use in miners and the 
development of lung cancer, raising questions about the causal relationship 
between radon exposure and lung cancer.41  However, from the 1940s on, federal 
officials actively discouraged research scientists from public discussion of the 
probable health hazards of radon in uranium mines, presumably to ensure 
maximum opportunity for nuclear weapons development.42  In relation to tribal 
populations, the U.S. as “trustee,” failed to disclose the potential health and 
environmental risks to tribal governments.43  On the Navajo Nation, the U.S. 
government awarded mining contracts to the Kerr-McGee Corporation and other 
companies, and forwarded the contracts to the Navajo Tribal Council for their 
“approval,” presenting them as a source of employment and economic development.  
The companies gave the PHS the names of the miners, and in return, the PHS 
agreed not to divulge potential health hazards to the employees nor inform those 
who became ill that their sickness might be attributed to the conditions in the 
mines.44 
Because the mines operated on tribal lands, no state laws applied that might 
have protected mine workers.45  The AEC took the position that it was not 
responsible for the health or safety of the Navajo workers.46  In addition, because 
the justification for uranium mining was national security, specific information 
about the mines was classified, and the federal government maintained sovereign 
 
human subjects and the potential extension of those principles to socially identifiable groups). 
40. Panikkar & Brugge, supra note 5, at 129 (discussing Begay v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 991, 
1007 (D. Ariz. 1984)). 
41. Brugge & Goble, supra note 28, at 1414. 
42. Id. at 1413. 
43. See Navajo Tribe v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 227 (1985) (in an action filed by the Navajo Nation 
against the United States for breach of trust, the court dismissed claims regarding government’s 
failure to control dangerous condition posed by uranium tailings, but held that government was 
accountable to the extent that it had failed to collect rents from third party lessees on behalf of 
Navajos). 
44. Johnston, Dawson & Madsen, supra note 6, at 120. 
45. As a general principle, states lack regulatory authority on trust lands within an Indian 
reservation, unless Congress specifically authorizes such jurisdiction. See, e.g., Washington Dep’t 
of Ecology v. U.S. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the EPA appropriately refused 
to permit State of Washington to apply its hazardous waste regulations to the activities of persons 
on tribal lands). 
46. Johnston, Dawson & Madsen, supra note 6, at 117. 
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immunity from suit.47  This situation did not change until after 1971, when the law 
shifted to allow commercial operators to directly acquire the fuel source, removing 
the role of the United States as the sole purchaser.48  Uranium production would 
now serve the public need for energy.  When the mining companies began selling 
directly to utility companies, state employment and mine safety laws became an 
issue for the companies.  In addition, the negative publicity about the PHS’s covert 
studies of African Americans in Tuskegee illuminated other instances of unethical 
government-sponsored public health studies among poor and minority populations, 
including American Indians.49  By Executive Order, the process to procure 
information protected by national security under the Freedom of Information Act 
was altered to facilitate public access to studies conducted during the Cold War, 
including military testing that exposed other citizens and communities to toxic and 
radioactive substances.50   
In the 1980s, Congress held hearings and heard testimony about the impacts of 
uranium mining on Navajo workers, and Congress ultimately passed the 1990 
Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA) (as amended in 2000) to provide 
limited compensation to miners or their widows, if they met stringent 
requirements that proved that radioactive exposure was the cause of the death or 
disability suffered by the worker/spouse.51  This is a tort model of legislation that 
authorizes individual payment to those who document that their injury is the 
direct result of the negligent conduct of the tortfeasors.  It does not compensate the 
Navajo Nation for the harm that it suffered and continues to suffer from the 
contamination of tribal land and water resources, and for the health impacts to 
tribal members.  In 1994, President Clinton appointed the Advisory Committee on 
Human Radiation Experiments (the “Committee”) to “investigate any unethical 
human experiments undertaken by personnel and/or agents of the United States of 
America and to make recommendations to ensure non-reoccurrence, if 
necessary.”52  The Committee found insufficient evidence of intentional human 
testing on the Navajo miners, although it cautioned the United States against 
 
47. See, e.g., Brugge & Goble, supra note 28, at 1416. 
48. See Johnston, Dawson & Madsen, supra note 6, at 117. 
49. See Panikkar & Brugge, supra note 5, at 134. 
50. See Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19825 (1995) (establishing a uniform system for 
“classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information” including a 10 year 
time limit on classification that pertains to most forms of government information). 
51. RECA, supra note 10. 
52. Special Rapporteur on the Implications for Human Rights of the Environmentally Sound 
Management and Disposal of Hazardous Human Wastes at ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/48/Add.1 
(Sep. 3, 2012) (by Calin Georgescu) [hereinafter Georgescu Report], citing FINAL REPORT, 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS [hereinafter Advisory Committee 
Final Report] (dealing directly with the federal government’s conduct on the Navajo Nation). 
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continuing its policy of affirmatively keeping health data secret from the 
individuals being studied.53  The Committee noted that the PHS’s decision not to 
warn the miners was inconsistent with the agency’s own regulation in effect from 
1951-78 authorizing disclosure of otherwise confidential information “whenever the 
Surgeon General specifically determines disclosure to be necessary . . . to prevent 
an epidemic or other grave danger to the public health.”54  The Committee further 
found that the United States played a pivotal role in putting the Navajo miners in 
harm’s way and in refusing to control the harms through procedures, such as 
ventilation of mines and protective gear, which were commonly applied to other 
mine workers in the country.55 
The Committee found that the government had a “moral obligation” to ensure 
that the risk to Navajo miners was not any greater than the risk to others under 
the prevailing standard at the time.56  Congress responded to this by authorizing 
limited compensation to affected Navajo miners and their families.57  The 
implication of this policy history is that the U.S. has paid appropriate 
“compensation” for the harms to Navajo workers under the 1990 statute.  Was this 
legislation an instance of “reparative justice” for the Navajo people, or was it a 
prudent attempt to narrowly frame a legal claim for tort liability?  Who decides?  
To answer those questions, one must evaluate the impact of the next phase of 
uranium production on tribal lands. 
B. The Power of the Marketplace: “Privatizing” Uranium 
Production 
After 1971, uranium production primarily served energy development in the 
private market.  The private market controlled the price of the resource and the 
conditions of extraction, triggering a cost-benefit analysis for the companies that 
factored in the costs of mine safety and tort liability.  Given the transition in 
federal policy that removed the guaranteed price paid by the U.S. as sole buyer, 
some mining companies dissolved or abandoned the uranium mines on the 
reservation, leaving huge piles of tailings, which are the refined byproduct of the 
ore.58  Between 1946 and the late 1970s, approximately 4 million tons of uranium 
ore was extracted from the Navajo Nation.59  For every 4 pounds of uranium 
extracted, an estimated 996 pounds of radioactive waste is generated as mine 
 
53. Georgescu Report, supra note 52, at ¶ 50. 
54.   Advisory Committee Final Report, supra note 52, at Part II Ch. 12.  
55.   Id. 
56.  Id. 
57.  RECA, supra note 10. 
58. See PASTERNAK, supra note 7, at 148. 
59. GAO Report, supra note 5, at 1. 
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tailings.60  Thus, the mere fact that a mine closes does not remove the hazards to 
human health. 
In some cases, the mining continued, but the leases were often conveyed to 
different companies, leading to uncertainty about the obligations of a particular 
company to remediate past harms of a prior lessee, as opposed to avoiding its own 
negligent operation.  This was the situation at Church Rock, where the United 
Nuclear Corporation (UNC) made a determination to continue operating the mine 
because Church Rock is in close proximity to Gallup, New Mexico, and was seen as 
a strategic site to serve the energy needs of the 22 commercial nuclear power 
plants operating as of 1971.61  UNC trucked the extracted uranium ore a short 
distance to its mill, which was just outside of the Navajo reservation, on the 
Nation’s eastern boundary.62  The arrangement clearly enabled UNC to extract 
and process the resource in the most cost-effective manner, enabling profit even 
after the government stepped out of its role as buyer.  However, the environmental 
costs were not factored into the equation because the statutory framework 
governing liability for uranium mines and mills was just emerging, and the 
Church Rock community would suffer from this regulatory gap.63 
By the 1970s, the radioactive tailings from the uranium mines had 
contaminated air, groundwater, streams, and soil on the Navajo reservation.  A 
political fight ensued, in which the federal government disclaimed responsibility 
for covering the huge piles of tailings.64  The political debate ultimately led to the 
complex web of federal statutes that governs uranium mining and milling 
activities today.65  However, in the early 1970s, there was little recourse for 
affected communities such as Church Rock.  UNC decided to liquefy and store the 
mill waste in large ponds of water held in place by an earthen dam,66  but the dams 
were not well maintained.67  In 1979, the mud dam near Church Rock failed, 
spilling over 1,100 tons of uranium tailings and an estimated 100 million gallons of 
radioactive wastewater into the Rio Puerco River on the Navajo Nation.68  This is 
 
60. Johnston, Dawson & Madsen, supra note 6, at 116. 
61. PASTERNAK, supra note 7, at 148. 
62. Id. at 149. 
63. UMTRCA, supra note 11 (previously the statutory framework covered radiation from mining 
operations, but not from mill tailings). 
64. PASTERNAK, supra note 7, at 148. 
65. See Segal, supra note 36, at 368-76 (discussing applicable federal statutes and general regulatory 
structure for uranium mining and milling activities). 
66. PASTERNAK, supra note 7, at 149. 
67. Johnston, Dawson & Madsen, supra note 6, at 122 (discussing a later U.S. Congressional 
investigation of the Church Rock spill which revealed that United Nuclear “had known of cracks 
in the dam structure at least two months before the break but had made no effort to make 
repairs”).  
68. Id. 
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the largest nuclear spill in U.S. history, although it did not receive the national 
attention of the spill at Three Mile Island, which also occurred in 1979.  
The Church Rock spill caused extensive damage to at least 1,700 Navajo 
residents, and contaminated their lands, water resources, and livestock.69  The 
contamination had devastating economic consequences to an already impoverished 
community, effectively foreclosing commercial sale of Navajo sheep to outside 
markets for three years.70  The same level of caution did not attach to subsistence 
use of the sheep by the Navajo people themselves.  Rather, the Indian Health 
Service area director, William Mohler, advised the Navajos that they could safely 
eat their sheep, so long as they avoided the organ tissue where radioactive toxins 
might lodge at unsafe levels.71  
Following the spill, the affected Navajo plaintiffs sought to bring a cause of 
action for damages against UNC in the Navajo Nation district court.72  However, 
this action was barred on jurisdictional grounds by an earlier ruling from the 
United States Supreme Court, holding that the United States government had 
implicitly preempted tribal jurisdiction over radioactive contamination on the 
reservation by centralizing any liability of nuclear companies in the federal 
courts.73  The earlier case also involved a claim by Navajo plaintiffs.74  The 
plaintiffs in that case sued El Paso Natural Gas Corporation and one of its 
subsidiaries, Rare Metals, for negligent operation of an open pit uranium mine in 
their community that contaminated the local water supply, causing injury to the 
Navajo families who drank the water for a fifteen year period before discovering 
the toxicity levels in the water.75  Although the Price-Anderson Act does not 
contain any provision foreclosing tribal court jurisdiction, the Supreme Court 
interpreted the statute as transforming into a federal action “any public liability 
action arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident.”76  The Court remanded 
the case for a determination on whether the claim constituted a “public liability 
action . . . resulting from a nuclear incident.”77  If so, the action would go to federal 
court.78  The Price-Anderson Act serves the United States government’s interest in 
protecting the nuclear industry from devastating damages judgments.  However, it 





72. See Tsosie, Charting the Future, supra note 16, at 220. 
73. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999). 
74.  Id.  
75. Id. at 477. 
76. Id. at 484. 
77. Id. at 488. 
78. Id. 
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tribal lands, as the Navajo plaintiffs discovered after the Church Rock spill.  
Eventually, UNC agreed to pay a minimal out-of-court settlement to the plaintiffs, 
thereby assuming some measure of responsibility for the harms that they had 
suffered.79  
CERCLA was enacted to ensure the cleanup of lands affected by toxic and 
hazardous waste, and it has been applied to reclaim lands contaminated by 
radioactive waste.80  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) oversees 
the enforcement process, in collaboration with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
by testing the area to determine the nature and extent of contamination, as well as 
by issuing an order listing applicable sites for remediation.81  There are complex 
rules detailing the procedures necessary to finance remediation.82  Some highly 
contaminated sites are placed on the Superfund National Priorities List (NPL), 
where clean up can be financed through the Superfund Trust Fund.83  None of the 
mine sites on the Navajo Nation are currently listed on the NPL.84  Under 
CERCLA, the companies that caused the contamination are required to remediate 
the condition to a “reasonable level,” and if they do not do so (or contest liability), 
the EPA can undertake the cleanup process and sue the companies for damages.85  
Potentially responsible parties include property owners at the time of the 
contamination, as well as the current owners, operators, and any active agents in 
the disposal process.86  All potentially responsible parties, including the 
government, where applicable, are jointly and severally liable.87  The EPA sets the 
standard for cleanup, but has discretion to deviate from this standard if cleanup of 
a particular chemical is “technically impracticable” or if the nature of 
contamination does not pose a significant threat to human health, given low 
population density or availability of an alternative water supply.88  On the Navajo 
Nation, the net result of this procedure is to put the companies and the EPA into a 
process that inspires these parties to work together to minimize their respective 
costs and liability.  The victims ought to be compensated, but they are not parties 
to the process.   
After the Superfund process was created under CERCLA in 1980, UNC closed 
 
79. See Tsosie, Charting the Future, supra note 16, at 220-21. 
80. Segal, supra note 36, at 370; GAO Report, supra note 5, at 15-18. 
81. GAO Report, supra note 5, at 15-18. 
82.   Id. at 18. 
83. See Segal, supra note 36, at 371. 
84.  GAO Report, supra note 5, at 18. 
85.  Segal, supra note 36, at 370. 
86. Id. at 371. 
87.  Id. 
88. Id. 
 Indigenous Peoples and the Ethics of Remediation 
219 
its off-reservation mill, and that site went onto the National Priority List in 1983.89  
However, the Rio Puerco site on the Navajo Nation did not merit the same 
treatment.90  In addition, the low population density in the Church Rock 
community and lack of public water infrastructure inspired the EPA to adopt lower 
standards for cleanup of contamination.  Furthermore, the EPA chose to devote its 
enforcement authority to environmental remediation, rather than to compensation 
for victims who had become ill from the radioactive contamination.  There was no 
broad-based compensation for the victims of the spill until 2011, when the 
combined efforts of the Navajo Nation’s Department of Justice and the U.S. 
Department of Justice resulted in a successful claim against a corporation in 
bankruptcy and a judgment of $1.2 million in damages.91 
The cleanup process at Church Rock is still in the planning stage and will be 
extensive.92  A 2003 study by the Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency 
revealed continuing radioactive contamination of water, soil, and homes built with 
rocks from the tailings piles.93  The exact number of abandoned uranium mines on 
the Navajo Nation is still unknown.  The GAO Report claims that over 500 sites 
are verified to date, but many commentators agree that there are very likely over 
1000 abandoned and partially unreclaimed uranium mines within the Navajo 
Nation.94  Consequently, the nature and extent of the contamination to air, water, 
and land resources from the cumulative impact of the mines and the deterioration 
of the sites over time has not been fully evaluated.  Similarly, the health impacts to 
the Navajo people of radioactive exposure have not been fully evaluated.95  
Existing research demonstrates high rates of lung and stomach cancer among 
residents in the Colorado Plateau region, as well as pancreatic, bladder, and 
 
89. PASTERNAK, supra note 7, at 150. 
90. Id. at 151. 
91. Segal, supra note 36, at 372 n. 131 (citing Feb. 24, 2011 press release from Navajo Nation 
Environmental Protection Agency). The EPA website also details the agency’s enforcement 
actions against Tronox Corporation and Kerr McGee in the respective bankruptcy actions for 
those companies and their subsidiaries for past contamination at sites throughout the country, 
including on the Navajo Nation. See Case Summary: Tronox Incorporated Bankruptcy Settlement, 
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/case-summary-tronox-
incorporated-bankruptcy-settlement (last visited Jan. 3, 2015). 
92.   According to the GAO Report, the goal of the five year plan to clean up the Northeast Church 
Rock mine was not met as of 2014. GAO Report, supra note 5, at 24. There have been two interim 
removal actions to remove 130,000 cubic yards of contaminated soil in the surrounding 
community, but they have not yet commenced a clean up of the mine. The EPA maintains that it 
has selected a clean up remedy and organized an interagency work group preliminary to the 
actual clean up effort. Id. 
93. See Johnston, Dawson & Madsen, supra note 6, at 123. 
94. See Panikkar & Brugge, supra note 5, at 122. 
95. Id. at 122. 
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reproductive organ cancers.96  In addition, it is likely that other serious health 
conditions, such as lung and kidney disease, are attributable to radioactive 
contamination.97  Epidemiologists struggle to determine the cause of a rare disease 
syndrome in this area known as “Navajo neuropathy,” which manifests in 
deformities of extremities and damaged eyes and livers.  They have yet to ascertain 
the respective genetic or environmental causes.98  The small sample size for 
residents in the area poses a caution for researchers who seek to document 
correlations between radioactive exposure and disease conditions or birth defects.99  
As an additional and complicating factor, biomedical data may be located in 
patient records within the state or federal (Indian Health Service) repositories, 
depending upon where the individual was residing or sought medical care.  There 
are significant legal and ethical issues that attach to biomedical research on Native 
American patients who are victims of radioactive exposure, and securing reliable 
data may be difficult or impossible under current conditions.100  The GAO Report 
documents an emergent effort to provide screening to Navajo residents and to 
“evaluate options for future health studies . . . and surveillance of health 
conditions,” but the full impacts to human health are unknown at this time.101 
Given the need for further documentation of risks to environmental and public 
health, the Navajo Nation took the reasonable and prudent approach of foreclosing 
further development of uranium on the reservation until the nature and extent of 
the prior contamination could be evaluated and addressed.  Through its elected 
officials, the Navajo Nation exercised its sovereignty to ban uranium production 
within the Navajo Nation in the Dine Natural Resources Protection Act of 2005.102  
In its legislative findings, the Navajo Nation Council cites the fundamental laws of 
the Dine people, which were codified in 2002 as Title 1 of the Navajo Nation Code, 
for the principle that the Navajo Nation’s natural resources are the foundation of 
the spiritual ceremonies and way of life of the Dine people, and that it is the “duty 
and responsibility of the Dine to protect and preserve the natural world for future 
generations.”103  In accordance with traditional teachings that counsel against 
disturbing “harmful substances” within the Earth, the Council concluded that 
 
96. PASTERNAK, supra note 7, at 156. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 156-57. 
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100. This issue is of great importance, but cannot be fully addressed in this article. Panikkar and 
Brugge have documented the ethical issues that attach to uranium mining on the Navajo Nation 
in relation to the human health impacts, and their excellent work should serve as a springboard 
for further analysis. See Panikkar & Brugge, supra note 5, at 140-41. 
101.  See GAO Report, supra note 5, at 26. 
102. NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 1301. 
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uranium extraction “should be avoided as traditional practice and prohibited by 
Navajo law.”104 
The Act proclaims that “no person shall engage in uranium mining or uranium 
processing on any sites within the Navajo Indian Country,” which is defined to 
include “all lands within the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation,” as 
defined in Title 7 of the Navajo Nation Code and 18 U.S.C. § 1151.105  
Interestingly, the federal definition of “Indian Country” is not identical to the 
Navajo Nation’s appraisal of “Navajo Indian Country.”106  Rather, the definition in 
Title 7 of the Navajo Nation code includes lands within the exterior boundaries of 
“the Navajo Indian Reservation or of the Eastern Navajo Agency,” as well as its 
satellite communities (“dependent Indian communities”), Navajo Indian 
allotments, lands held in fee by the Navajo Nation, and “all other land held in trust 
for, owned in fee by, or leased by the United States to the Navajo Nation or any 
Band of Navajo Indians.”107  Thus, an important issue for future consideration is 
whether the Navajo Nation can regulate uranium production on lands that are 
technically outside the reservation, but which still may be within Navajo 
communities. 
C. The Current Policy Era: Uranium Production on or Near Tribal 
Lands 
Radioactive contamination of tribal lands is often associated with past federal 
policies.  However, there are several important issues that currently affect tribal 
governments seeking to regulate uranium production on or near tribal lands.  
First, nuclear energy is increasingly touted as “green energy” that will not have the 
harmful consequences of fossil fuels in an era of climate change.108  Thus, uranium 
production may again be perceived as a “public good,” only now the “good” is cast 
as the need to curb excessive greenhouse gas emissions and facilitate the “energy 
transition” necessary to ameliorate climate change.  Importantly, the U.S. 
government still controls the nuclear industry, and federal statutes can preempt 
tribal authority to protect tribal members and tribal lands from the impacts of 
uranium mining.  For example, when tribal governments have sought to regulate 
the transport of nuclear waste across tribal lands, the federal courts have held that 
their jurisdiction to close the roads or provide additional protections that unduly 
 
104. Id. § 1301(D). 
105. Id. §§ 1302(A) & 1303. 
106. See Tsosie, Charting the Future, supra note 16, at 222. 
107. NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 254. 
108. See Jeanne Marie Zokovitch Paben, Green Power and Environmental Justice: Does Green 
Discriminate?, 46 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1067, 1086 (2014) (discussing nuclear energy as a form of 
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burden nuclear energy development has been preempted by federal law.109 
Second, U.S. public lands policy governs federal lands adjacent to the 
reservation, including the operation of uranium mines on those lands.110  Thus, 
uranium mining on federal public lands can jeopardize tribal resources, including 
water, air, and cultural resources.  However, tribal governments do not have the 
power to stop uranium mining on public lands unless there are other legal rights at 
stake.  For example, in the early 1990s, the Havasupai Tribe challenged the U.S. 
government’s decision to allow uranium mining in the Grand Canyon, asserting 
that the site was part of the Tribe’s aboriginal land base (its reservation today is 
located at the bottom of the Grand Canyon) and that mining on these lands would 
affect the health and well-being of tribal members, as well as their ancestral 
cultural and religious sites.111  However, in Havasupai Tribe v. United States, the 
federal courts held that the U.S. government met its procedural obligation to 
consider these effects by generating an Environmental Impact Statement under 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).112  According to the court, the 
federal land manager was under no duty to take a particular substantive course of 
action to avoid these impacts upon the Havasupai, and thus, the uranium mining 
could commence.113  Although the Obama Administration subsequently issued a 
moratorium on new uranium mining in the Grand Canyon, existing mines that 
were operational prior to the moratorium enjoy vested rights.114  The recent shift in 
energy policy to promote uranium production has triggered controversy as to 
whether active uranium mining ought to commence under existing leases, new 
leases, or both.115  The Havasupai Tribe is still heavily invested in this issue. 
 
109. See e.g., N. States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Cmty., 991 F.2d 458, 
462 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that tribal ordinance requiring companies transporting nuclear waste 
across reservation to obtain a tribal license was preempted by the federal Hazardous Materials 
Transportation Act). 
110. See GEORGE C. COGGINS, CHARLES F. WILKINSON & JOHN D. LESHY, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND 
RESOURCE LAW 340 (5th ed. 2002). 
111. Havasupai Tribe v. U.S., 752 F. Supp. 1471, 1489 (D. Ariz. 1990), aff’d, 943 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that government approval of uranium mine on public lands under administration of U.S. 
Forest Service did not jeopardize any tribal legal rights). 
112. See id. at 1505.  
113.  Id. 
114. On January 9, 2012, the Obama administration announced a 20-year ban on new mining claims 
on public lands near the Grand Canyon National Park, but exempted the approximately 3,000 
existing sites already approved under federal law. See Jonathan DuHamel, Uranium mining ban 
near Grand Canyon all politics, no science, ARIZ. DAILY INDEPENDENT (Apr. 28, 2014), 
http://www.arizonadailyindependent.com/2014/04/28/uranium-mining-ban-near-grand-canyon-all-
politics-no-science/. See also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Secretary Salazar Announces 
Decision to Withdraw Public Lands Near Grand Canyon from new Mining Claims (Jan. 9, 2012), 
available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Secretary-Salazar-Announces-Decision-to-
Withdraw-Public-Lands-near-Grand-Canyon-from-New-Mining-Claims.cfm#. 
115. See Press Release, Grand Canyon Trust, BLM Fails to Respond to Groundwater Contamination at 
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Third, land status is very important to the question of whether uranium mining 
can commence on the reservation.  Under the current self-determination policy, 
tribal governments decide whether to mine on tribal trust lands.116  Tribal 
governments also possess regulatory authority over their trust lands, as well as 
allotments held in trust by tribal members.117  However, the Supreme Court has 
limited tribal jurisdiction to regulate fee lands held by non-Indian landowners 
within the reservation.118  Consequently, on reservations where there are mixed 
holdings of fee and trust land within a particular area, there are significant 
obstacles to effective regulatory authority.  This situation exists within the Navajo 
Nation’s Church Rock chapter.  The jurisdictional issues are further compounded 
by the fact that the EPA regulates the cleanup of past contamination from 
companies who have closed their mines, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
regulates the licensing of new uranium mines that may pose a threat of future 
contamination.  The two federal entities do not coordinate effectively, and existing 
standards may not protect tribal interests. 
Many reservation communities continue to be affected by the mixed patterns of 
land ownership on the reservation.  As a result of the 19th century allotment policy, 
which was codified in the Dawes Allotment Act of 1887, there are often non-Indian 
fee lands within the external boundaries of a reservation.119  Current courts 
consult those early acts to determine whether the statutes diminished the 
boundaries of the reservation, thereby authorizing state jurisdiction, or whether 
the reservation boundaries persist, albeit with trust and non-Indian fee parcels 
 
Pinenut Mine (Aug. 4, 2014), available at http://www.grandcanyontrust.org/news/2014/08/feds-
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intersecting within a “checkerboard” area.120  In either situation, state law may 
govern the question of whether a mining company can engage in uranium 
production on fee land, even though the population demographic in the area is 
predominantly Native American.  This issue is being actively litigated on the lands 
near Church Rock, in areas contiguous to the reservation, but which have varying 
land ownership interests in the surface and subsurface estates.121  The 
“checkerboard lands” were granted by the U.S. to the railroad companies in 
sections.122  The alternating sections were held in the public domain and then 
granted to other owners, including lands set aside by Executive Order for the 
Navajo people, and lands granted to non-Indian settlers.  Today, the “checkerboard 
area” in New Mexico, which is contiguous to the eastern boundary of the Navajo 
Nation reservation, is composed of trust lands held in Navajo tribal ownership, 
trust lands held by individual Navajo allottees, and fee lands held in private 
ownership.  Section 8 is one of the areas of fee land.  
Hydro-Resources, Inc. (HRI), a company that engages in uranium mining, owns 
lands within Section 8.123  In 1989, the New Mexico Environmental Department 
approved a “discharge plan” for HRI in connection with the company’s proposed 
plan to commence active uranium mining in the area.  HRI also applied to the EPA 
for an aquifer exemption in the area where the mining would occur, which was 
initially approved by the agency.124  HRI subsequently sought to extend the permit 
to lands within Section 17.125  The surface rights in Section 17 are held by the 
United States in trust for the Navajo Nation.  However, the mineral rights and 
some surface rights are owned by HRI.126  After a hearing and comment period, the 
EPA determined that Section 17 constituted “Indian land” under the agency’s 
underground injection control (UIC) program, and the EPA declined to extend the 
permit.127  The EPA also found that the EPA, rather than the state, should also 
regulate the fee land within Section 8, because it is situated within a “dependent 
Indian community” for jurisdictional purposes.128  The New Mexico Environmental 
Department disagreed with this determination and continued to process HRI’s 
 
120. Id. See also FELIX S COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 310 (1942). 
121. This section builds on my earlier published research, but has been updated to reflect more recent 
developments. See Tsosie, Charting the Future, supra note 16, at 223-25. 
122. For a description of how this “checkerboard” area originated, see Hydro Resources, Inc. v. U.S. 
EPA, 608 F.3d 1131, 1136 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc) [hereinafter Hydro Resources v. EPA (en 
banc)]. 
123. HRI has now become “Uranium Resources, Inc.” See Smith, supra note 1. 
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permit.129  “Indian Country” is the jurisdictional touchstone for applying federal 
and tribal regulatory authority instead of state authority.130  The EPA used a 
“community of reference” test that looked at the population demographic and 
potential environmental exposure of the residents in the area, rather than at the 
technical ownership status of the section of land.  The area in question was the 
home of primarily Navajo residents, who were grazing livestock and using water 
resources in the area.  Furthermore, the area was situated within the political 
boundaries of the Church Rock Chapter, and under Navajo Nation governance.  
Given the complicated dimensions of the land status and asserted authority of 
the Navajo Nation, the federal government (EPA), and the state of New Mexico, 
the case wound up in the federal courts.  The federal district court and Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the EPA had authority to administer the UIC 
program of the Safe Drinking Water Act in collaboration with the Navajo Nation 
on the lands within Section 8 (as a “dependent Indian Community”) and within 
Section 17 as “Indian lands.”131  In a split decision, the Court of Appeals, sitting en 
banc, rejected this holding as to Section 8, finding that the “community of 
reference” test was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s definition of a 
“dependent Indian community” in the Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie case, and 
ruled that the lands within Section 8 should be regulated by the state of New 
Mexico.132  Thus, the state of New Mexico had the ability to issue the requisite 
permit under the Safe Drinking Water Act, which was needed for the mining 
operation to move forward.   
The current in situ leach (ISL) technology for mining uranium, which is what 
HRI proposed, involves drilling and use of water and chemical compounds to 
“leach” uranium out of deep deposits.133  The process carries a significant risk of 
contamination to the underground water supply, and also uses a large quantity of 
water.134  Both issues are problematic from a tribal governance perspective and 
require coherent management.  Unfortunately, that is not possible.  The regulatory 
authority that governs the HRI mining operation is split between the state (Section 
 
129. Id. 
130. See id. See also Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) (finding the 
fee lands owned by Native Alaskan tribal governments are not “dependent Indian communities” 
because they are not under the “superintendence or supervision” of the federal government, as are 
tribal trust lands). 
131. Hydro-Resources, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 562 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2009). 
132. Hydro Resources v. EPA (en banc), supra note 122. 
133. Segal, supra note 36, at 380. See also Morris v. U.S. Nuclear Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677, 682 (10th Cir. 
2010) (describing the ISL mining process in which uranium is separated from the chemical 
compound, processed into yellowcake, and shipped to other facilities where it is enriched for use 
as reactor fuel). 
134.  Id. 
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8) and federal or tribal environmental protection agencies (Section 17), which have 
responsibility for effectuating the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, which issues new permits for uranium mining.135  
Notably, the respective government entities do not use the same standards to 
assess the safety of the ISL process.136  This set of issues gave rise to another 
action, in which affected Navajo residents of the Church Rock chapter sued the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to enjoin its decision issuing a mining permit to 
HRI.137   
In Morris v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the decision of the NRC to license HRI’s permit to mine uranium 
on four sites within the “checkerboard area,” using the ISL process.138  Two sites 
are near Church Rock, and the other two sites are near Crownpoint, New 
Mexico.139  The license was issued collectively for the “Crownpoint Uranium 
Project.”140  All of the sites share a common aquifer system with tribal lands and 
constitute the major source of drinking water for the thousands of local residents, 
97% of whom are Navajo.141  HRI commenced its application process with the NRC 
in 1988, triggering an environmental review under NEPA.142  Because Section 17 
is within the Navajo reservation, it was necessary to involve the participation of 
the agencies exercising oversight authority over these lands.143  In 1997, the NRC, 
in cooperation with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA), issued a final environmental impact statement, 
recommending that the NRC grant HRI’s license application, and the license was 
granted in 1998.144 
An association of concerned Navajo residents (Eastern Dine Against Uranium 
Mining) and other environmental and community organizations filed suit, seeking 
review of the NRC’s licensing decision.  In the Morris case, petitioners argued that 
the NRC’s decision violated the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as 
well as the requirements of NEPA.145  Specifically, the petitioners cited the current 
regulation under the Atomic Energy Act, which limits acceptable levels of airborne 
 
135. Segal, supra note 36, at 378; see also Cooley, supra note 28, at 419-20 (discussing state and federal 
jurisdiction under the SDWA on lands within the “checkerboard area”). 
136.  Segal, supra note 36, at 378-79. 
137. Id. at 378-81 (discussing the facts leading up to Morris, supra note 133). 
138. Morris, supra note 133, at 677. 
139. Id. at 681. 
140. Id. at 682. 
141. Tsosie, Charting the Future, supra note 16, at 224. 
142.  Morris, supra note 133, at 681. 
143. Id. at 682.  
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 681. 
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radiation from an NRC-licensed operation to 0.1 rem per year.146  Petitioners noted 
that there was already extensive airborne radiation in Section 17, due to the 
unremediated conditions of the earlier uranium mining, and the cumulative effect 
of a new source of radiation would pose a public health hazard, thereby precluding 
issuance of a permit under the Atomic Energy Act, which provides that a license 
shall not issue where it would compromise public health and safety.147  The court 
rejected this argument, holding that the NRC had acted reasonably in limiting its 
determination of airborne radiation to the “new” proposed source, rather than the 
cumulative dose in the area.148   
The court’s decision to ignore the actual level of radioactive exposure, which far 
exceeded the maximum standard, was only possible because the court construed 
the residue from the unremediated uranium mines in the area as “naturally 
occurring background radiation” under the terms of the statute.  As Judge Lucero 
noted in his dissenting opinion, this term is not defined in the statute, but should 
be given a reasonable construction as the level of radiation that occurs naturally 
within certain geographic regions because of the constituent minerals in the earth, 
rather than as the result of toxic residue from earlier, unremediated contamination 
by a mining company.149  Additionally, the majority of the court concluded that the 
NRC had acted reasonably in requiring HRI to restore the quality of the 
groundwater in the future, after mining activities have concluded, rather than 
requiring the company to secure water quality in the present for the residents and 
their livestock.150  This astounding conclusion was justified under the court’s 
reading of NEPA, which “does not prohibit an agency from approving a project 
with negative cumulative effects, so long as the agency considered those affects.”151  
Thus, HRI was poised to start a new set of uranium mines within “Navajo Indian 
Country,” once again to the detriment of the Navajo people. 
The outcome of the Morris case differs significantly from the national sentiment 
about nuclear waste.  There is a continuing national debate around where to site 
nuclear waste, and to date, no state has agreed to house a permanent repository 
for the vast stores of radioactive waste within the country.  At one point, the U.S. 
government was offering incentives to tribal governments, including the Mescalero 
Apache Tribe and Skull Valley Paiute Tribe, to house this waste.  This was hotly 
challenged as an example of “environmental injustice” for Native Nations.152  The 
 
146. 10 C.F.R § 20.1301(a)(1); Morris, supra note 133, at 684. 
147. Morris, supra note 133, at 685-86. 
148. Id. at 689. 
149. Id. at 707 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
150.  Id. at 701. 
151. Id. at 705. 
152. See Lincoln L. Davis, Skull Valley Crossroads, 68 MD. L. REV. 290 (2009) (discussing proposal to 
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reality is that the U.S. already has created a de facto nuclear waste dump on the 
lands within the Southwest that are home to the Navajo Nation and other tribes.  
The largest pile of radioactive waste is located on the fee lands near Church Rock, 
New Mexico, within the Navajo Indian Country.  Furthermore, the White Mesa 
Uranium Mill, owned by Energy Fuels, is the only conventional uranium mill 
currently operating in the United States.  The White Mesa Mill is located ten miles 
from Blanding, Utah, which is near the Navajo Nation, and it is only two and a 
half miles from the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe’s White Mesa community.153  The mill 
processes all of the ore from the mines near that Grand Canyon, and it is not a 
coincidence that Energy Fuels owns and operates the uranium mines in the Grand 
Canyon as well as the mill.    
It is apparent where the benefit of uranium production resides today.  It is also 
clear that the Native people of this region continue to bear a disproportionate level 
of harm from the radioactive contamination of air, water, and land caused by the 
mining and processing of uranium in the Southwest.  Yet, the affected 
communities lack any direct governance authority over the White Mesa Mill 
because it is on state, rather than tribal land.154  The rights of tribal members, if 
any, are dependent upon access to the civil rights enjoyed by all Americans, 
namely the right to sue for environmental compliance if the company is in violation 
of a federal or state law that permits “citizen’s suits.”   
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has adopted regulations under the 
Clean Air Act imposing technical limitations on radon emissions from uranium 
mines.155  Because the Clean Air Act contains a citizen’s suit provision, it is 
possible for claimants to file a lawsuit if the company is in non-compliance, which 
requires testing and documentation, and if the data supports a finding of non-
compliance under the technical limitations established by the regulations.  In 
short, this option entails a long, arduous, and expensive process that requires 
substantial scientific and legal expertise and is well beyond the ability of the 
average “citizen.”  In a rural area like Blanding, where many residents lack the 
education or monetary resources to bring this type of lawsuit, securing “justice” 
 
store high level nuclear waste on tribal lands). 
153. See Press Release, Grand Canyon Trust, Lawsuit Expands as More Pollution Problems Emerge at 
White Mesa Uranium Mill (July 30, 2014), available at http://www.grandcanyontrust.org/news/ 
2014/07/lawsuit-expands-pollution-problems-emerge-white-mesa-uranium-mill/ (noting that the 
Grand Canyon Trust expanded its lawsuit against Energy Fuel Resources after receiving records 
indicating further air quality violations by the White Mesa Uranium Mill reflecting increased 
levels of radon pollution).  
154. See id. See also Grand Canyon Trust v. Energy Fuel Resources, Complaint for Declaratory Relief, 
Injunctive Relief; and Civil Penalties, Case No. 14-cv-00243-DBP, filed in central division of 
federal district court in Utah on April 2, 2014. 
155. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.252 & 61.252(a) (establishing emissions limits and work practice standards). 
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under the law will likely depend upon intervention by a third party with resources 
and standing to bring this federal claim. 
D. Human Rights Implications 
Johnston, Dawson, and Madsen describe the human costs of uranium mining 
and milling on the Navajo Nation as involving three central injustices.156  First, as 
a historical matter, the United States treated Navajo and other American Indian 
workers differently from its own atomic energy scientists and lab workers, because 
it failed to disclose or warn the Native workers of the dangers of radiation, while it 
took precautionary measures to protect the health of its own scientists and lab 
workers.  Second, the federal government studied the health effects among Native 
workers and documented their illnesses, but failed to notify them or provide any 
compensation for the illnesses and deaths until 1990, when these events came to 
public attention, and Congress enacted legislation.  However, even after 1990, 
many Native workers could not recover because they lacked the forms of 
documentation that other employees were given to prove dates of their 
employment and the hours that they worked in the mines.  Finally, the 
government has failed to remediate much of the ecological damage caused by 
uranium mining and milling, including the contamination of land and water 
resources.  Not only has the government failed to remediate the radioactive 
contamination caused by past mining and milling, but also continues to license 
new mining operations on and adjacent to tribal lands. 
As demonstrated above, domestic law is only partially responsive to addressing 
the environmental and human costs of uranium mining and milling on tribal 
lands.  Assuming that the domestic construction of justice is insufficient to protect 
the Native peoples of the Southwest, we could look to the U.N. Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the “Declaration”) for guidance on the norms that 
might define justice.  This is the approach recommended by Walter Echo-Hawk, 
the legendary Pawnee attorney who litigated many of the most important civil 
rights cases for Native people in this Nation’s history.157  The Declaration takes the 
position that Indigenous peoples have civil rights equal to those of other citizens 
within their society, so it is a harm to treat them differently for purposes of 
employment, political access, education, health, or any other area of social 
development.158  The Declaration also proclaims that Indigenous peoples have a 
right to autonomy as “peoples,” and that this entails a collective right to govern 
 
156. See Johnston, Dawson & Madsen, supra note 6, at 111. 
157. See WALTER ECHO-HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR AND IN THE LIGHT OF JUSTICE 
(2010). 
158. See Declaration, supra note 13, at art. 1-2. 
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themselves on their territories and under their own political, economic, and social 
institutions.159  Finally, the Declaration requires that the rights of Indigenous 
peoples be fully respected by providing redress for past harms and by ensuring 
that contemporary institutions and laws meet the conditions for justice.160 
It is apparent that the human rights of Native American peoples, such as the 
Navajo Nation, have been heavily impacted by the historical context of nuclear 
development in the United States.  They are also affected by contemporary energy 
policy because their land continues to hold reserves of uranium.  Many of the 
Declaration’s provisions describe the rights of Indigenous peoples to their 
traditional lands, waters, and resources, and call upon States to engage Indigenous 
peoples when taking actions that would impair these resources, and also to offer 
compensation for unlawful or unjust appropriations of land that have already 
taken place.161  To the extent that Indigenous lands have been appropriated and 
contaminated by radioactive waste, the nation-states ought to have an obligation 
to provide redress.  This should include remediation of radioactive contamination, 
as well as a duty to insure that future decision-making (for example, about where 
to store nuclear waste or how to transport it across tribal land) is made in 
cooperation with the affected Indigenous communities. 
The unique harms of uranium mining might also be considered under several 
specific provisions of the Declaration.  For example, Article 29 provides that 
“Indigenous peoples have the right to the conservation and preservation of the 
environment and the productive capacity of their lands or territories and 
resources.”162  States have two corresponding and related duties.  First, States are 
required to take “effective measures to ensure that no storage or disposal of 
hazardous materials” takes “place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples 
without their free, prior, and informed consent.”163  Thus, even if tribal lands are 
not directly involved, it would seem that adjacent areas within traditional tribal 
territories qualify as protected areas.  Second, States must take measures to 
monitor, maintain, and restore the health of indigenous peoples who have been 
affected by toxic or hazardous materials.164  This provision obviously requires 
States to study and consider the impacts to human health and the environment, as 
well as to develop programs to address the health conditions experienced by 
 
159. See id. at art. 3-4. 
160. See, e.g., id. at art 28 (covering redress for lands and resources which have been taken or damaged 
without the free, prior and informed consent of the Indigenous people). 
161. See Rebecca Tsosie, Reconceptualizing Tribal Rights: Can Self-Determination Be Actualized 
within the U.S. Constitutional Structure?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 923, 942-43 (2011). 
162. Declaration, supra note 13, at art. 29. 
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164. Id. 
 Indigenous Peoples and the Ethics of Remediation 
231 
peoples that have already suffered from radioactive exposure.  It is not clear that 
either requirement has been honored in the context of uranium mining in the 
Southwest. 
Article 10 provides that “Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from 
their lands or territories,” and further states that any relocation must take place 
with the “free, prior, and informed consent of Indigenous peoples” and “after 
agreement on just and fair compensation and, where possible, with the option of 
return.”165  This provision is relevant for many Indigenous communities, such as 
those at Church Rock, New Mexico, or White Mesa, Utah, which might be asked to 
vacate highly contaminated lands in the future to avoid serious health 
consequences to tribal members.  While relocation is commonly understood to be a 
viable solution to toxic contamination in non-Native communities, it is a human 
rights violation to separate Indigenous peoples from their traditional lands without 
their “free, prior, and informed consent.”  In fact, many tribal members will refuse 
to move from a contaminated site as individuals, and it is very difficult to move an 
entire community, particularly where only some members are deemed to have a 
dangerous risk of exposure based on their proximity to the contamination.166  
Radon gas emissions fall more heavily on residents living closest to the tailings 
and processing site.  Thus, it is likely that any future attempt to offer monetary 
compensation for relocation will be to individuals, rather than to the entire 
community. 
Finally, the human rights implications of radioactive contamination can be seen 
as an international or domestic issue related to military activity.  To a large extent, 
the existence of radioactive waste in Indian Country is a byproduct of the U.S. 
military’s activities and requirements.  Article 30 of the Declaration provides that 
“military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous 
peoples, unless justified by a relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed 
with or requested by the indigenous peoples concerned.”167  The latter requirement 
imposes the obligation upon States to “undertake effective consultations with the 
indigenous peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular 
through their representative institutions, prior to using their lands or territories 
for military activities.”168  While the United States will undoubtedly argue that its 
 
165. See Declaration, supra note 13, at art. 10. 
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historic support for uranium production on the Navajo Nation was justified by the 
public’s interest in national security, this should not be sufficient to outweigh the 
continuing harms of the policy upon the Navajo people.  At the very least, the 
United States should be held accountable for the damage caused by its policies, 
including the cost of documenting the nature and extent of the harms, as well as 
the cost of remediation, and it should be required to make a full disclosure to the 
Navajo Nation and its members.169  As discussed in the next section, this model 
has been at least partially employed for the Island Nations of the South Pacific, 
which were once considered “wards” of the U.S., but are now recognized as nations 
and parties to a “Compact of Free Association” (the “Compact”) with the United 
States.  
II. Radioactive Contamination in the South Pacific 
The United States engaged in widespread nuclear weapons testing in the South 
Pacific between 1946 and 1958, and this had devastating consequences for the 
Indigenous people of the Marshall Islands and other Island nations.  This region 
has been heavily contaminated because of its use by nation-states for nuclear 
testing over many decades, leading some commentators to describe the area as “the 
nuclear Pacific.”170  In 1985, the thirteen independent and self-governing states of 
the region joined together as “the South Pacific Forum” and adopted the “South 
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty,” reclaiming the area from the military control of 
other nation-states.171  Similar language was incorporated into the domestic 
constitutions of modern states, such as Palau, as they “decolonized” their 
governance structures during the modern era.172  However, by this time, the 
damage was extensive, and the consequences have been devastating for the 
Indigenous peoples throughout the Pacific, who share cultural ties, but have long 
maintained a sovereign existence upon their respective islands.  The United States 
and other nations used the South Pacific for weapons testing as though the Islands 
were “vacant” or “desert” lands to be sacrificed for the “greater good” of national 
 
169. The issue of disclosure is very important here. Prof. Francisco Rivera mentioned that this is a 
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security.  This reprises the dynamic of domestic weapons testing, which primarily 
occurred in rural areas with small populations.173  In many cases, of course, these 
“desert” areas are also the homelands of Indigenous peoples.174 
According to Davor Pevec, an attorney who represented the Enewetak people, 
the United States conducted sixty-seven nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands 
during that period, primarily on the Enewetak Atoll and the Bikini Atoll.175  “The 
yield of the tests in the Marshall Islands totaled 108 megatons which is equivalent 
to 7,200 Hiroshima bombs.”176  During the time of the testing, the Marshall Islands 
were part of a United Nations Trust Territory, administered by the United States.  
In its trustee capacity, the United States made a specific promise to “protect the 
inhabitants against the loss of their lands and resources.”177  However, it clearly 
did not uphold that promise.  In particular, the “Bravo shot” on March 1, 1954 was 
the largest U.S. nuclear test in history, equivalent to 1,000 Hiroshima-type atomic 
bombs.178  The massive hydrogen bomb vaporized two islands in the atoll 
altogether, as well as part of the Island of Nam (which remains highly 
contaminated), forming a huge cloud of radioactive fallout, which then drifted in 
“the wrong direction,” irradiating inhabitants of the Rongelap and Utrok (Utirik) 
Atolls, as well as the crew of a Japanese fishing vessel named “the Lucky 
Dragon.”179 
The program of U.S. reparations for this interval of history has strong 
correlations to the experience of Native American people, and yet, it also has a 
distinctive history because the Marshall Islands ultimately negotiated an 
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independent political status through their Compact of Free Association, which is 
also the instrument that structured the terms of “reparations” for the victims of 
U.S. nuclear testing.180  This section of the article discusses two sets of claims that 
are implicated by the Compact: the claims of individual people who were the direct 
victims of radioactive fallout from the bombs, and the claims of the Native people 
who were relocated from their Islands to accommodate the testing.  The first set of 
claims follows the standard U.S. tort model of reparative justice for victims of 
government negligence that causes direct physical harm to specific individuals.  
The second set of claims involves the multiple political, economic, social, and 
cultural harms suffered by Indigenous peoples, who are relocated from their 
traditional lands and then seek repatriation of those lands, including restoration of 
the lands to a habitable condition.  Repatriation of land is vital to sustain the claim 
of the people of the Marshall Islands for self-determination.  The problem, of 
course, is that the lands are hazardous to human health in their current state, and 
this can only be remedied by extensive remediation efforts.  There are parallels in 
this experience to that of Indigenous peoples within the United States, and there 
are also lessons to be learned.181 
A. The Tort Model of Compensation for Victims of Radioactive 
Contamination 
The tort model of compensation for innocent victims of the radioactive 
contamination was the predominant mechanism for redress available for victims of 
radioactive contamination caused by the actions of the U.S. in the Pacific until the 
1980s.182  In 1986, Congress finally settled the damages claims that had been filed 
against the United States by agreeing to the Compact for Free Association, 
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inclusive of the Section 177 agreement that established a $150 million Nuclear 
Fund.183  Prior to 1986, efforts at compensation were largely targeted at certain 
classes of individuals.  For example, in 1957, Congress enacted the “Law for Health 
Protection and Medical Security for A-Bomb Sufferers,” directed at the Japanese 
people who survived the bombings in Hiroshima City and Nagasaki City.184  The 
class of claimants designated as “A-Bomb sufferers” were people living in those 
areas who required medical care because of their exposure to the radiation.185  
These payments were made to Japan, but calculated per sufferer.  The U.S. 
government also conveyed the sum of $2,000,000 to the Japanese government for 
the harms to the Japanese fishermen of the Lucky Dragon and the larger fish 
industry that was impacted by the radioactive fallout of the Bravo test in the 
South Pacific.186 
In a 1974 Report, a Study Committee on radioactive contamination in the 
Marshall Islands compared the treatment of Japanese victims with the people of 
“Rongelap and Utirik,” who were not enemies of the U.S., but were instead the 
“innocent victims of error and negligence on the part of the United States.”187  The 
United States had appropriated $950,000 in a 1964 statute as a “compassionate 
responsibility to compensate inhabitants in the Rongelap Atoll, in the Trust 
Territory of the People of the Pacific Islands, for radiation exposure sustained by 
them as a result of the thermonuclear detonation at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall 
Islands on March 1, 1954.”188  The sum was granted to the Secretary of the Interior 
to be administered to affected inhabitants (or if they had died, to their heirs) in 
“full settlement and discharge of all claims against the United States” arising from 
the Bravo bomb.189  The resultant distribution was vastly insufficient to pay the 
multitude of injuries and harms that the people had suffered.  Moreover, the 
authors of the report noted that the U.S. was acting as a “trustee” at the time of 
the bombing, and should have honored its “sacred trust” with the people, which 
was to “promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the 
people of Micronesia and to also protect their lands, their health and foster their 
general welfare.”190  Because of this trust responsibility, the authors of the report 
observed, it was inappropriate to employ the narrow calculation given by nations 
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for “war claims,” namely “the economic value of a human life, or the economic 
impairment or loss suffered by injury and medical treatment.”191 
This statement contains the heart of what I want to argue in this paper, which 
is that a trustee has a greater moral duty to repair harm than a nation that does 
not have this responsibility (such as the United States and Japan, which were at 
war with one another as political equals).  The U.S. assumed a trust responsibility 
to American Indian Nations, such as the Navajo, and it also assumed a trust 
responsibility to the people of the Marshall Islands.  This affirmative act 
authorized the United States to act on behalf of the Indigenous nation and 
therefore supports a greater responsibility to account for the harms to land, human 
health, and traditional Indigenous economies and societies.  However, instead of 
acknowledging this responsibility, the United States has relied upon the 
vulnerable status of these Indigenous groups, employing the notion of the “ward”—
a group of individuals who may be removed from their lands, poisoned by 
radioactive materials, and then must petition the very government that caused 
these circumstances for “relief” as a matter of charity, rather than as a matter of 
right.  In comparison, the principles of reparative justice that govern compensation 
for wartime injuries caused by the negligent or intentional acts of nations are seen 
as a “matter of right,” rather than as an instance of charity.  In the case of the 
Marshall Islands, reparative justice has entailed a claim for repatriation of the 
Islands that were appropriated by the U.S. for military use.  Repatriation of land is 
central to Indigenous self-determination, and is fundamentally linked to the 
political and cultural sovereignty of Indigenous peoples.192  This is equally true for 
American Indian Nations, the Native Hawaiian people, and the peoples of 
Micronesia. 
B. Reparative Justice for Indigenous Peoples: Honoring Self-
Determination and the Right to Repatriation 
At the time the testing took place, the people of the Marshall Islands were in a 
distinctive political relationship with the United States, as the inhabitants of a 
U.N. “Trust Territory,” under U.S. administrative authority.193  Under this 
relationship, the people of the Marshall Islands had Constitutional rights to their 
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land (as private property), and the U.S. had an obligation to protect the people and 
their lands.194  This meant that the United States had the power to test nuclear 
weapons in the area (as a “trust territory” or possession of the U.S.), and it 
exercised this power by determining that it would remove the people from the 
areas of direct bombing (such as Enewetak and Bikini), and then effectuate 
agreements of resettlement with the affected people.195  The U.S. promised to 
compensate the people for the loss of use of the property or damage to it, and it 
assured the groups that the removal would be temporary, that the U.S. 
government would take care of them while they were away from their Island, and 
then they would be resettled at home. 
1. Enewetak 
The United States military used the Island of Enewetak continuously between 
1947 and 1980.196  The U.S. officially ended atmospheric testing in 1958, and then 
signed a test ban treaty with the Soviet Union in 1963.197  However, after it 
stopped nuclear testing, the U.S. used the Island for intercontinental ballistic 
missile testing, high-energy upper level rocket testing (fueled by the toxic 
substance of Beryllium), and Pacific cratering experiments (which entailed 
detonating explosives as a means of predicting the impact of nuclear detonations 
upon strategic defense installations).198  The U.S. even suggested using the Island 
of Nam for a permanent U.S. nuclear waste dump, a suggestion that was rejected 
by the Bikini Council.199   
Prior to their relocation, the people of Enewetak had lived on their Island for 
generations and maintained the close cultural relationship that all Indigenous 
peoples maintain with their traditional lands.  In the words of one expert who 
offered testimony:  
For Marshall Islanders in general, and Enewetak people in 
particular, land is a part of one’s person and one’s entire 
identity.  It is an integral part of a person’s sense of who they 
are in the world . . . .  One’s sense of self, both personal and 
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cultural, is deeply embedded in a particular parcel of land on a 
particular atoll.200   
The Enewetak people maintain clan relations and the clans hold specific lands.  
This relationship is intergenerational and tied to the practice of traditional 
subsistence lifeways, including agriculture and fishing.  All of this was disrupted 
when the people were relocated from their land to Ujelang, which did not have the 
same features to permit continuation of these lifeways. 
The Enewetak people were exiled on Ujelang for over 33 years, and they 
suffered from malnutrition, illness, lack of health care, and lack of education.  The 
U.S. paid little attention to the situation of the Enewetak people until 1974, when 
the First Congress of Micronesia pressured Congress to hold hearings on the 
damage and residual radiation at Enewetak, as well as the situation of the 
survivors of the radioactive fallout from the testing.  The Department of Interior 
produced reports documenting the harms to the people who had been relocated, 
and the testimony of survivors and physicians documented the extensive impacts 
of the radioactive contamination on the health and lands of the affected people.  In 
response to this evidence, the U.S. government engaged in an extensive cleanup, 
rehabilitation, and resettlement effort between 1977 and 1980.201  The cost of this 
effort was over $100 million, and yet, only the southern half of the Enewetak atoll 
was inhabitable.  The cleanup was insufficient to rehabilitate the soil or re-
vegetate the land.  So, although the Enewetak returned to their atoll, they did not 
return to the same natural environment, nor were they the same people, given the 
years of extensive hardship and health impacts that they endured. 
In the 1980s, the Enewetak people filed a claim against the U.S. in the Court of 
Claims for the damage to and loss of use of their lands, as well as the other 
hardships they suffered.202  A total of 14 cases were filed by different groups of 
Marshall Islanders for takings of land and tort damages.203  Some of these 
concerned the impact of the nuclear fallout on the groups in adjacent areas, who 
were suffering from leukemia, thyroid cancer, and other documented health 
conditions related to extensive radioactive exposure.  Congressional hearings had 
documented that the earlier assumptions that government officials made about the 
toxic load and potential health impacts had been vastly underestimated.204  Some 
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of the children had been exposed at levels thousands of times higher than those 
which had been predicted.205  One victim, Lekoj Anjain, was one year old when he 
was exposed to the radioactive fallout of the Bravo test on his home Island of 
Rongelap, which is approximately 100 miles from the Island of Bikini.206  Many of 
the Rongelese were burned, disfigured, and became sick from the radioactive 
exposure.207  Lekoj lived to the age of 19, when he died in the NIH hospital in 
Bethesda, Maryland, from complications related to leukemia and pneumonia.208 
Through the litigation process, attorneys discovered that although the U.S. had 
tested the people of the Marshall Islands and documented their condition, it had 
also concealed the results from the victims.209  This was consistent with the Navajo 
Nation’s experience.  In both cases, the health effects of radioactivity were 
classified as secret under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1946 for purposes of 
national security.210 This shameful history, along with the momentum of 
international self-determination for the trust territories in the South Pacific under 
the United Nation’s decolonization principles, inspired a complex political 
restructuring of the U.S. relationship with the Marshall Islands, as well as a 
political solution to the multiple cases that were pending in the U.S. courts.211  In 
1983, the United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands concluded a 
treaty process by signing a Compact of Free Association, which was then 
formalized in a 1986 Joint Resolution from Congress.212  The Compact replaces the 
former Trusteeship with a new political relationship recognizing the independence 
of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, as well as its right to structure the terms 
of a future political engagement with the United States.  The Compact includes a 
subsidiary arrangement (the Section 177 Agreement), which established a $150 
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million Nuclear Fund, the income from which is earmarked for the people of the 
four different atolls as “a means to address past, present and future consequences 
of the Nuclear Testing Program.”213  The U.S. also set aside a fund to establish a 
“Nuclear Claims Tribunal,” which would have jurisdiction to render “a final 
determination upon all claims past, present and future, of the Government, 
citizens and nationals of the Marshall Islands which are based on, arise out of, or 
are in any way related to the Nuclear Testing Program.”214  The Section 177 
Agreement is intended to constitute the full settlement of all claims against the 
United States, and it specifies that any pending claims in U.S. courts would be 
dismissed.215  This includes the claims for takings of property under the U.S. 
Constitution, as well as the damage to land and human health caused by nuclear 
testing. 
After the Compact of Free Association went into effect, the U.S. filed motions to 
dismiss all of the pending cases on the grounds that the cases were non-justiciable 
and involved political questions, given the Compact’s express provisions.216  The 
Enewetak people protested that the sums that were set aside were not sufficient to 
constitute the Constitutional measure of damages for loss of property (just 
compensation), but the Court of Claims dismissed all of the cases, finding that the 
adequacy of compensation would be established by the Claims Tribunal, and thus 
the issue was not appropriately before the federal courts.217  The Marshall Islands 
Nuclear Claims Tribunal was constituted in 1988.  The Tribunal was to be in place 
for 15 years (due to terminate on September 30, 2002) and the Compact was 
subject to renegotiation.218 
The Enewetak people brought their claims before the Tribunal for “loss of use of 
their land, for the costs to restore the land to a condition of full and unrestricted 
use, and for the hardship and suffering they endured while in exile on Ujelang.”219  
According to Pevec, the damages to the Enewetak people for loss of land alone 
would amount to an award of $244 million.220  The cost to restore was predicted to 
include the cost of full “radiological remediation” (half of the Island was 
uninhabitable, and the people from that part of the Island would still need to be 
resettled at an estimated cost of 100 million dollars), and also the cost of “soil and 
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plant rehabilitation” (estimated at 18 million dollars).221  Hardship damages are a 
product of calculating the pain and suffering of a group, displaced from its home for 
33 years and subjected to conditions of overwhelming poverty and deprivation.  As 
Pevec notes, it is hard to calculate the cost of famine, starvation, disease epidemics 
(including measles and polio), and rat infestation.222  And even if those costs could 
be distilled to a hard figure (such as the figure of $7,000-$10,000 dollars per person 
per year estimated for the American citizens who were forcibly relocated to the 
Japanese Internment camps during WWII), how would it be possible to calculate 
the spiritual and emotional harm of being removed from sacred lands, in some 
cases witnessing the land being “vaporized,” and having to see the barren “physical 
skeleton” of a once rich and prosperous homeland?223  Despite the vast extent of 
damages, the Tribunal could only award the Enewetak people a small portion of 
their loss, namely $1.7 million.224 
2. Bikini 
The people of Bikini suffered a similar set of harms.225  The U.S. government 
removed them from their lush, tropical Island and sent them to the Island of 
Rongerik, which has a place in their traditional stories as “the home of an evil 
spirit, a devil woman, and fish that were poisonous.”226  Once there, the people 
faced starvation because the fish on that reef are indeed poisonous.227  They 
suffered high rates of illness and death throughout the time they stayed on the 
Island.  In 1972, after declaring the Island “radiologically safe,” 100 people were 
resettled on the Island of Bikini.228  However, in 1978, lab tests revealed high 
levels of radioactive compounds in their blood, and they were once again taken off 
of the Island.229  Most of the people from Bikini and their descendants live on the 
Island of Kili, though they continue to press for repatriation of their Island.230  The 
Native people strongly advocate soil remediation, but scientists are concerned that 
the Island’s food resources, such as coconut trees and the crabs that feed on 
coconuts, are highly radioactive.231   
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Ruth Guyer has documented the impacts of this history on the health and well-
being of the people of Bikini.  According to Guyer, the Nuclear Claims Tribunal 
awarded the people of Bikini $563 million in damages, although Congress must 
appropriate that sum, and the bulk of it will go to cleanup and repair of the 
physical damage to the Island.232  She states: 
The fundamental human right of the Bikini people to live in a 
safe environment and in their own land . . . was trumped by 
shows of military might at Bikini during the Cold War. Both at 
that time and in the intervening years, other rights of these 
people—the right to protection from harm, the right to have 
their autonomy respected, the right to be told the truth, the 
right to just treatment, have routinely been ignored.233 
C. Lessons for the Future 
The case studies from the South Pacific carry several lessons for other 
Indigenous peoples.  Reparations to Indigenous peoples who were victims of 
nuclear contamination are a continuing issue throughout the world, because 
Indigenous peoples are either living on those lands or want to return home to lands 
that are badly contaminated, and which will cost millions and probably billions of 
dollars to clean up—if they can ever become “clean,” meaning safe for human 
habitation.234  In the context of the Bikini Islanders’ claims, “on principle, the 
Bikinians wanted—and still want—the U.S. to accept full remediation as a moral 
obligation.”235  This would not only entail monetary payments, but also the return 
of displaced people to their place of origin.  However, U.S. officials point out that 
repatriation of the Islands for human habitation would require massive removal of 
soil, and the U.S. lacks any obvious place to put 1.2 million tons of contaminated 
soil.  In short, the U.S. argues, restoration of the land would not only be cost-
prohibitive, but would also result in further environmental damage.236 
The “moral obligation” of the U.S. to repatriate the land is related to the 
struggle for Indigenous self-determination.  As one commentator observes: 
The importance of a return to traditional lands and a return to a 
traditional lifestyle for the Bikini, Enewetak, and Maralinga 
[Australian Aboriginal people] is connected to a long and 
complicated history.  Cultural identity amongst Pacific Islanders 
and Aboriginal Australians is a geographical identity that flows 
from memories and values attached to places.  Oral traditions, 
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religious and spiritual beliefs, superstitions and lore often trace 
the evolution of cultural identity through sacred symbols and 
sacred places.237 
For the peoples of the Pacific Islands, the relocation and harm to their Islands is 
compounded by the impacts of climate change.  Many Island nations in the South 
Pacific are being submerged into the ocean due to global warming and rising sea 
levels.238  The destruction of cultural knowledge from the loss of Island lands is 
staggering: “In coastal villages and island nations the sea is a guide to social 
history.  Certain reefs, channels, islands, passages and seamounts are associated 
with particular spirit beings.”239  The Polynesian peoples chart their histories and 
genealogies by the stories attached to the various Islands they have lived upon and 
visited, and in relation to the stars in the night sky which guided their voyages for 
centuries.240  There is a link to ancestral history, spiritual associations, stories, and 
intergenerational knowledge, and all of this may be lost as the lands are 
appropriated for other uses.   
Some may argue that it is not feasible to reclaim severely contaminated lands.  
However, if we accept the view that a given land base is permanently 
contaminated and cannot be inhabited again by human beings, what would 
preclude a judgment that the land should become a permanent disposal site for 
nuclear waste that cannot be safely placed anywhere else?  The “public good” 
argument can be used to support a notion of “sacrifice areas.”  For example, the 
intensive use of the Four Corners Region for coal strip-mining and power plants 
fueled the growth of large urban centers in California, Arizona, and Nevada, but 
devastated lands belonging to the Navajo and Hopi people within this region, 
which were ultimately designated as a “national sacrifice area.”241  Similarly, the 
rapid development of the “Tar Sands” in Canada is devastating Indigenous lands 
and resources.242  It is unclear whether the Native people will be displaced from 
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these lands, or whether they will live with the toxic debris of this energy 
development and suffer the harms for generations to come.  A recent health report 
confirms a link between development of tar sands in Canada to increased cancers 
and other serious illnesses among the Native people in these communities.243  The 
study also documented that the increase of cancer fell disproportionately upon 
women, those who worked in the oil fields, and those who consumed traditional 
foods and locally caught fish.244 
D. Summary and Conclusions 
The debate over the future of contaminated Islands in the Pacific should inspire 
a global human rights dialogue on “international sacrifice areas” and the 
disproportionate harms for Indigenous peoples living within traditional, 
subsistence economies.  Similarly, the dialogue about Indigenous self-
determination, which is exemplified by the Compact with the Marshall Islands and 
the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ought to promote a vision of 
Indigenous governance and participation in decision-making, instead of a 
conversation about what happens to the “vulnerable victims” of events that are 
beyond their control.  The “helpless victim” image was embedded within the 
narrative of 19th and early 20th century colonial nations who sought to reduce 
Indigenous peoples to the status of “wards.”  In this way, the appropriation of 
Indigenous political and cultural rights by the dominant government could be 
justified because it was for the good of the ward.  This cannot be the narrative of 
contemporary Indigenous self-determination.  However, if self-determination 
merely means that the Indigenous group agrees to use its lands for the broader 
“public good” in exchange for money and the right to participate in global capital 
markets, then it is pointless to argue that there is any independent moral value for 
this right.245  In this case, an Indigenous Nation’s right to “self-determination” is 
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purely an instrumental political right, recognized by the domestic nation-state 
because it aligns with its own benefit.  Conversely, if self-determination means 
that the Indigenous group has a right to protect its traditional lands and lifeways 
as well as the health of its members, or that the Indigenous group merits redress 
for harms suffered during the “wardship” era, then the concept does have moral 
weight.  Assuming that Indigenous peoples are exercising a traditional, cultural 
duty to protect the lands that were given to them at Creation, there is a principled 
basis for this claim, albeit one of Indigenous rather than European origin. 
It is unclear whether the U.S. model of treating Indigenous peoples as 
“domestic, dependent nations,” which supports the right of tribal governments to 
develop coal and uranium on tribal lands under federal law, is the type of 
governance model that would truly facilitate an “ethics of remediation” in the 
service of Indigenous self-determination.246  It may be more instructive to examine 
the governance models that were created in the South Pacific in the wake of 
decolonization.  The states of the former United Nations-sanctioned Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands—the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), the 
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), and the Republic of Palau (ROP)—are now 
independent political entities, capable of making claims for reparations from other 
nations.247  The Island nations now have a political relationship of “free 
Association” with the United States.  They are no longer part of a “Trust Territory” 
as a “ward” of the U.S.  They are exercising self-determination, but also demanding 
reparations sufficient to meet the moral obligation that they understand belongs to 
the United States because of its past practices, as well as the economic limitations 
that have been imposed upon recovery from the Tribunal. 
As of 1998, according to a study by the Brookings Institute, the people of the 
Marshall Islands have received “four compensation packages to redress the 
damage from U.S. nuclear tests.”248  In 1956, the U.S. government gave the Bikini 
Islanders $25,000 in one dollar bills and a $3 million trust fund to offset the costs 
of their displacement, which provided them “with annual payments of about $15 
(then-year) per person.”249  In 1964, they received the $950,000 payment for the 
damage caused by the Bravo bomb.250  And, in 1986, Congress created a $150 
million trust fund for the Marshall Islands, supplemented by an additional $90 
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million in 1996.251  It was also in 1996 that the Tribunal adopted a policy of 
making initial payments of 25% of each award because it could not pay the full 
amount.252 
In addition, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) asserts that it provides “high 
quality medical care” for the approximately 130 individuals who survived the 
Bravo test and high levels of radiation and require health care costing 
approximately $18,000 per year per person.253  Medical surveillance and 
monitoring of radiation levels is a big part of this cost.  Many individuals developed 
cancer or had to have their thyroid glands removed to avoid thyroid cancer.  The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) completed a study in 1994-95 of 
thyroid cancer in the Marshall Islanders.  Studies have also documented an 
increased incidence of stillbirths and miscarriages among pregnant women in the 
first four years after exposure.254  The DOE currently provides care to 137 of the 
54,000 inhabitants of the Marshall Islands, and the Department of Interior 
assumed responsibility for providing general medical care to 11,000 inhabitants in 
the 1986 Compact.255  The Brookings Institute Study estimated the total 
compensation costs to the people of the Marshall Islands as “at least $759 million” 
in 1998.256 
Thus, reparations to the people of the Marshall Islands included monetary 
damages for claims related to loss of use value for land and property, costs of 
remediation and cleanup, and “hardship and consequential damages.”  There are 
ongoing problems with loss of land and cultural identity from the relocation and 
contamination, spiritual harms, and harms to food “as shared substance, and as a 
material part of their life.”257  There are also significant intergenerational harms to 
human health.258  Monetary compensation “can only partially meet concerns for 
social justice,” and can never alleviate the physical, spiritual, and social harms 
that the Marshallese have suffered.”259   
How does the experience of the people of the Marshall Islands line up with 
broader notions of reparative justice, or with the specific experience of American 
Indian Nations with U.S. reparative justice?  The next section of this article will 
address those questions. 
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III. Indigenous Peoples and Reparative Justice:  A Framework 
for Consideration 
For Indigenous peoples within the United States, the discussion of reparative 
justice centers around the obligations of nations, and the primary injustice has 
been a refusal by the United States to admit that it should assume the multiple 
moral, legal, and political obligations assumed in treaties with Indigenous nations, 
which also approximate the political relationship between Great Britain and 
Indigenous nations.260  Instead, successive eras of Supreme Court jurisprudence 
seek to differentiate which “legal” obligations imposed by the treaties survived into 
the modern era, versus which treaty rights have been invalidated by contrary 
applications of federal law.261  The core of the U.S.-tribal treaty relationship, of 
course, was the United States’ obligation to protect Indian nations, given their 
physical incorporation into the U.S. as “domestic dependent nations.”262  The 
federal duty of protection was specifically delineated in many Indian treaties and 
is of vital importance, given that the initial effect of the “domestic, dependent 
nation” status was to remove the ability of a Native Nation to engage in multi-
lateral treaty relationships with various sovereigns.263  Without the political 
authority to negotiate with other sovereigns and without the population necessary 
to declare “war” upon the United States, most Indian nations during the 19th 
century were placed at the mercy of the federal government.  Thus, the moral 
bargain embedded within Indian treaties maintains that the U.S. assumed a 
sacred “trust” obligation to protect the Indian nations against incursions from U.S. 
citizens, the states, or any other sovereign government.264  The U.S. government 
affirmatively assumed a moral duty to act in good faith to further the best interests 
of the Indian people.   
In fact, however, the United States used its “plenary” authority under federal 
law to diminish the rights of Indian nations during the 19th century, using the 
fiction that they had the status of “wards” and could have their affairs managed for 
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them by a supposedly beneficent federal guardian.265  Thus, the federal 
government exercised its power without an effective limiting principle, arguably 
violating its trust duty to protect the Indigenous nations.  In Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock, for example, the United States Supreme Court held that Congress 
maintained the political authority to dispose of tribal lands as it believed 
necessary, and that any violation of Indian treaty rights was a “political” issue that 
was not justiciable in the federal courts.266  Following this line of reasoning, the 
“wardship” status attributed to American Indian nations enabled the federal 
government to use tribal lands to build its nuclear defense program and use the 
labor of tribal members without offering them precautionary measures to protect 
their health.267  The actions of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), when 
evaluated in retrospect, were highly damaging and exploitive to tribal interests.  
And the AEC wielded a political power with the Department of Interior and federal 
land management agencies that enhanced its ability to mine uranium at the lowest 
cost for the country.  The political status of Indian nations as “wards” of the U.S. 
clearly worked against their rights during the era of nuclear weapons 
development.  The costs were not apparent to the tribal government at the time of 
the injury, and it has been virtually impossible to sue the trustee for any damages, 
except the failure to collect lease payments as directed by the terms of a given 
contract with a mining company.268 
In the United States, reparations for radioactive contamination on tribal lands 
proceeds under principles of compensatory justice.  As noted above, the Radiation 
Exposure Compensation Act provides statutory authorization for victims of 
radiation exposure, and affected individuals may sue corporations under principles 
of tort law, to the extent consistent with the parameters of the Price-Anderson 
Act.269  Injuries to tribal governments, such as contamination of land and water, 
are a different matter.  Tribal governments face an uphill battle in obtaining 
remediation of radioactive contamination, as the Navajo Nation cases demonstrate.  
The Navajo Nation is not a direct party to the CERCLA action, but must rely upon 
the federal Environmental Protection Agency to bring enforcement actions against 
the potentially responsible parties.270  In addition, multiple federal agencies 
participate in the federal remediation effort, including the EPA, the BIA, the DOE, 
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the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Indian Health Service, and the CDC.271  
This may seem like a positive structure, given the differing expertise and resources 
of each agency.  However, it should be apparent from the discussion above that the 
Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission are successors of the 
Atomic Energy Commission, and in that sense, they serve the broader public 
agenda for energy development and national security.  In addition, the IHS and 
BIA are notoriously underfunded and do not have the resources to engage a full-
scale effort to protect public health on the Navajo Nation.  Thus, it is at least 
arguable that the multi-agency effort is subject to political agendas inconsistent 
with making full reparation for the moral and legal wrongs of radioactive 
contamination on the Navajo Nation. 
With this background in mind, the following discussion examines whether the 
domestic legal structure is sufficient to meet the moral requirements of reparative 
justice, or whether an alternative structure is needed. 
A.  Reparations and Justice Theory 
The concept of reparations may be used to support legal, political, or moral 
claims for justice, and it is broadly applicable to relationships between individuals, 
groups, and nations.272  As applied to individuals and groups within a domestic 
legal system, reparative justice entails “making amends, offering expiation 
(atonement), or giving satisfaction for a wrong or injury.”273  This is widely 
understood as the dominant principle justifying damages for breach of contract or 
redress for injury to property or persons under our domestic tort and property law 
systems.  As applied to nations, reparations entail compensation payable for 
injuries suffered by innocent victims during wartime or payment for damages 
sustained as a result of hostilities with the defeated nation.274  The dominant 
model of reparations under domestic and international law is based on principles of 
compensatory justice rather than restorative justice. 
In comparison, Martha Minow argues that for societies that have emerged from 
episodes of mass violence, reparative justice ought to embody an ideal of 
“restorative justice,” sufficient to repair the harms and to institute future changes 
to correct the injustice.275  Minow’s argument is supported by philosopher 
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Margaret Walker’s account of “moral repair,” which examines what it means “in 
moral and human terms, to respond adequately in the wake of wrongdoing and 
serious harm.”276  Walker posits that such a response must align with principles of 
justice “in an ancient and enduring sense, putting individuals in right relationship 
with each other and communities as a whole,” and in accordance with mutually 
agreed measures of “what is due to each other.”277   
Building on these arguments and others, I will argue that the account of 
reparative justice that will be embodied within an “ethics of remediation” must be 
“intercultural,” and must respond to a mutually agreed upon account of the harm 
that was caused to Indigenous communities and the needs that must now be 
addressed.  The potential “modes of reparations” that support an “ethics of 
remediation” must be broad and inclusive.278  Minow suggests, for example, that 
various forms of reparative justice might be appropriate in any given case because 
they will serve different purposes.279  Material reparations, including money or 
resources, serve as a symbolic replacement for what was lost.280  This is important, 
but not complete.  Where actual replacement of what was wrongfully taken from 
Indigenous peoples is possible, restitution might be preferable, facilitating the 
return of wrongfully appropriated land, cultural objects, and human remains.  
Apology offers verbal acknowledgement of responsibility for wrongdoing and 
affords victims the chance to forgive or refuse to forgive.281  Public apologies and 
memorials may be used to highlight the injury to the larger society, as a 
mechanism of public atonement to the victims.  Similarly, the use of “truth-telling 
commissions” might be an integral part of the reparative process, because they 
vindicate the experience of those who suffered the harms, as well as their 
descendants, and serve to “correct the historical record,” given the pervasive 
tendency of governments to minimize or deny historic (and sometimes ongoing) 
harms.282   
Under the restorative justice approach, the process of reparations has a 
material component and an intangible, psychological component.  At a minimum, 
it is important to emphasize the humanity of victim and offender, to repair social 
or political connections, restore trust, and instill a sense of peace, rather than 
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ongoing conflict.  In order to “heal” the past, victim groups must be able to move 
beyond their sense of powerlessness and vulnerability, and they may need to tell 
their stories and have the public acknowledge them.  To date, this has not occurred 
in any meaningful way for Indigenous groups that have suffered from radioactive 
contamination.  Rather, the approach of the United States to reparative justice for 
Indigenous groups tends to focus on material compensation.  For example, the loss 
of Native lands has largely been compensated by monetary judgments paid under 
the authority of the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, which also authorized 
tribal access to the Court of Claims for post-1946 cases of property damage or tort 
damage caused by federal conduct.283  Significantly, the GAO Report mentions that 
many Navajo community members stated that “an official apology from the federal 
government for failing to ensure that companies” engaged in uranium development 
on the Navajo Nation “were protective of the environment and public health would 
go a long way toward improving relationships.”284 
There have been limited cases of restitution to Native peoples in the United 
States, mainly of cultural objects and human remains under the Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990.285  In some cases, Native Nations 
have achieved restitution of land, with the most famous example being the 
restitution of Blue Lake to the Taos Pueblo.286  There have also been a few, 
sporadic “apologies” for past bad behavior.  In the Radiation Exposure 
Compensation Act, Congress apologized on behalf of the nation to all affected 
uranium miners (Native and non-Native) and their families.287  President Obama 
apologized to Native Americans for past misdeeds of the United States in a rider 
buried in a huge defense appropriations bill.288  Assistant Secretary of Indian 
Affairs, Kevin Gover, apologized to Native Americans on behalf of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs for the historic wrongs caused by that agency.289  The U.S. Congress 
issued a Joint Resolution in 1993, apologizing to Native Hawaiians for the 
overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom and calling for a process of “reconciliation.”290  
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As of 2014, however, it is unclear what this entails.  Although they have some 
access to some benefits under federal programs for health, education, cultural 
maintenance, and social welfare, Native Hawaiians do not have the same political 
status as federally-recognized Indian tribes.291  They do not have a recognized 
government, and therefore they do not enjoy the same political rights to 
consultation and legislative protection as tribal governments do.   
To date, the apologies to Native Americans have not been coupled with tangible 
redress.  Nor has the United States established a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission on the impacts of its egregious past policies toward Native Americans, 
as other nations have done.292  In fact, federal policymakers often demonstrate 
resistance to renaming historic sites to reflect historical truth, as demonstrated by 
the controversy over renaming the Wounded Knee monument to reflect its identity 
as the site of the U.S. Cavalry’s massacre on innocent and unarmed Native people, 
rather than a “battlefield.”293  In general, Americans are very suspicious of 
“reparations” for particular groups within what they view as a “unitary” society.  
The United States Congress has steadfastly opposed reparations for African 
American slavery or for the harms to Mexican citizens, including appropriation of 
property and denial of civil rights, after annexation under the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo.294  Americans routinely ask: What do they want now?  How much will this 
cost us?  Can’t they “just get over it”?  The responses illustrate the problem.  
Reparations are deemed unnecessary in a society where “we” are all “Americans,” 
and no one alive today actually committed the “historical” wrong.295 
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However, for Native peoples, the politics of “equal citizenship” that undergirds 
this view is insufficient.  Rather, a constitutional politics of “representation” 
pertains, requiring the United States to recognize the separate national identities 
of American Indian nations (and certainly of the Nations of the South Pacific 
Islands) and to meet their claims to redress past and present injustice.296  In this 
way, Indigenous self-determination provides the baseline requirement for an 
effective theory of reparative justice. 
B. Native Peoples and Reparative Justice for Radioactive 
Contamination  
As demonstrated above, the harms of radioactive contamination experienced by 
the Navajo people and Pacific Islanders are related to U.S. imperialism and to this 
country’s treatment of Indigenous peoples as “wards” that could be sacrificed for 
the public good (designated first as military security, and after 1971, as energy 
independence).  Of course, the United States will argue that it did not “intend” to 
harm the Indigenous peoples, and therefore lacks moral responsibility for the 
multiple harms that have ensued.  Yet, Native peoples in the Southwest and the 
Pacific Islands continue to suffer the effects of loss of land, poisoned food, water, 
and air, and intergenerational health impacts.  They have suffered spiritual and 
emotional harms, as well as the economic and social harms caused by dislocation.  
If climate change has the effect that many scholars foresee, there will be a second 
wave of harm and displacement.297  This type of impact on small, land-based 
populations that are already in jeopardy could be even more devastating than the 
last wave.  Therefore, the discussion of reparative justice for the harms of 
radioactive contamination must necessarily focus not only on past “wrongs,” but 
also on the current disparities, inequities, and vulnerabilities that pertain to the 
Indigenous peoples of these regions to assess what is now due to them. 
For Native peoples, “the discussion about reparations . . . is a discussion of how 
the past, present and future are co-joined and interdependent.”298  Any discussion 
of reparative justice ought to engage Native normative frameworks of justice 
because, for Native peoples, reparative justice is a process that is “simultaneously 
emotional and spiritual, political and social.”299  There is no “uniform” theory of 
reparations that can fit all cultures, all nations, and all peoples.  Rather, the theory 
will differ depending on the particular historical context and cultural framework 
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that applies.  For Native peoples, any discussion of reparative justice for 
radioactive contamination must take into account the historical parameters of 
injustice for Native peoples. 
Under principles of compensatory justice, reparations are deemed appropriate 
only where one group has suffered some legally cognizable harm at the hands of 
another.300  Of course, only a limited subset of the actual harms to Native peoples 
can be redressed under existing law, because much of the harm occurred due to the 
diminished political rights of Native people under U.S. law.  Even today, Native 
peoples are constrained by the limitations imposed by federal courts in recovering 
damages for “breach of trust,” which is the available cause of action to sue the 
federal government for its negligence in allowing mining companies to contaminate 
tribal lands and waters.301  Although the federal government no longer uses the 
language of “wardship,” the trust doctrine has become a narrow legal calculus 
designed to avoid financial cost to the federal government.  Thus, to the extent the 
tribe has suffered injury because the trustee was acting for the “public” benefit, 
rather than for the benefit of its tribal beneficiary, there may not be any effective 
legal recovery. 
In addition, the current environmental conditions are to some extent 
exacerbated by the political, economic, and social harms of past government 
policies, which now result in significant economic and social challenges for many 
tribal governments.  For example, former Assistant Secretary Kevin Gover 
apologized for the misdeeds of the Bureau of Indian Affairs over the past century 
by describing the net harm to Native peoples as “intergenerational”: 
The trauma of shame, fear, and anger has passed from one 
generation to the next, and manifests itself in the rampant 
alcoholism, drug abuse, and domestic violence that plague 
Indian country.  Many of our people live lives of unrelenting 
tragedy as Indian families suffer the ruin of lives by alcoholism, 
suicides made of shame and despair, and violent death at the 
hands of one another.302 
With significant social and economic disparities to overcome, tribal governments 
simply lack the ability to deal with the environmental and health costs of 
radioactive contamination.  Can they look to their “trustee” for assistance for 
prospective relief (as opposed to past “damages”)?  What is the role of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs?  It is interesting that the Bureau of Indian Affairs actually 
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supported the new ISL mining project proposed by HRI on the lands within Section 
17 owned by the Navajo Nation.303 
How does this discussion of reparative justice line up with an ethics of 
remediation for radioactive contamination?  Within the Navajo Nation, the bulk of 
the harm is positioned as monetary reparations to “clean up” severely 
contaminated lands and resources within the constraints of CERCLA’s process.  
The CERCLA process attempts to invoke a “polluter pays” approach, in which all 
responsible parties share in the payment for harms caused.  To the extent that the 
U.S. government shares complicity (as the BIA does because it approved the leases 
for uranium mining, perhaps in part responding to pressure from the AEC to open 
these reserves on tribal land), the U.S. (through the EPA) must actually sue itself.  
Naturally, it is in the interest of every defendant to attempt to “settle” claims for 
some amount less that its actual liability, and this appears to be true for the 
federal defendants in that action as well as for private defendants. 
The CERCLA process responds to past harm.  What about the possibility of 
further contamination from new mining activities?  Except for the EPA, federal 
and state agencies appear to support the further development of the significant 
reserves of uranium within the Navajo Nation and on the “fee lands” within the 
“checkerboard area.”  There is also significant support to continue mining uranium 
on “public lands” within this region, such as the Grand Canyon, which are 
contiguous to reservation lands, and are part of the traditional territory of several 
Indigenous Nations within this region.304  This indicates that, once again, the 
trustee is acting to further the public benefit, rather than to protect the interests of 
Indian nations. 
So, where does Indigenous governance fit into this equation?  At this level, it is 
necessary to separate the moral and political construct of “self-determination” from 
the construction of tribal rights that exists under domestic federal law.  From a 
human rights perspective, Indigenous peoples possess a right to self-determination 
as “peoples” within their traditional territories.305  In comparison, prevailing 
federal law largely restricts the jurisdiction of tribal governments to trust lands on 
the reservation and tribal members, unless there are specific statutes supporting 
tribal jurisdiction.306  The Navajo Nation possesses 25% of the recoverable uranium 
in the country, which means that if national energy policy favors production of 
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uranium, the tribal government will be pressured to develop reserves on trust 
lands within the reservation.307  Currently, the Navajo Nation Code bans uranium 
mining within the Navajo Indian Country; however, the news report that inspired 
this article suggests that the pressure has already begun.308  The political 
sovereignty of the Navajo Nation supports its decision to develop or refuse to 
develop uranium on trust lands.  On fee lands, however, that is not the case. 
As discussed above, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the parcel of 
fee land owned by Hydro-Resources, Inc. within Section 8 of the “checkerboard 
area” adjacent to Navajo trust land and within the Church Rock Chapter was not 
within a “dependent Indian community.”309  Consequently, state regulatory 
authority will govern this land in a district that is overwhelmingly populated by 
Navajo people, rather than allowing the EPA and the Navajo Nation to regulate 
the area.  The costs to human health and the environment, however, will be born 
primarily by the Navajo Nation and its trustee, the United States.  Similarly, the 
Tenth Circuit’s decision in Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, authorizes Hydro Resources, Inc. to move forward with its ISL 
mining permit, based on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s determination of 
what is consistent with “public safety” in this area.310  In Section 17, the surface 
rights are under tribal ownership, but the existing radiation levels already exceed 
the maximum exposure limits, and it is unclear whether the groundwater 
contamination can ever be remediated.  The Navajo residents rely upon the 
groundwater as a source of their drinking water and the water for their livestock.  
The risk of harm is on the Navajo people.  What should the federal role be?   
In the final section of this article, I will argue that the contemporary role of the 
federal government should be to support the Navajo Nation’s right to self-
determination, using existing principles of the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples to ascertain the appropriate moral and legal requirements of 
“environmental” self-determination.311  The federal government is still the 
“trustee” for the Navajo people.  The federal government also controls national 
energy policy, national security, and public health.  There is no existing available 
site for high-level nuclear waste, nationally or internationally.  The contamination 
of the past has yet to be remediated.  Drawing on work in disaster ethics, climate 
ethics, environmental and climate justice, and environmental ethics, the 
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concluding section of this article develops the framework for an “ethics of 
remediation.”  
IV. Toward an “Ethics of Remediation” 
Remediation of nuclear contamination is a serious and pervasive global issue.  
This article has focused on the consequences of radioactive contamination for 
Indigenous peoples in the South Pacific and in the Southwest.  However, the 
broader issues include contamination of land and inland and ocean waters by 
military use of nuclear weapons, temporary storage of tailings or waste pending a 
“permanent” repository, and by failed power plants, including the facilities at 
Chernobyl and Fukushima, Japan.  The obligations of the government to affected 
citizens are routinely governed by domestic law and by the theoretical view that 
civil society is governed by a “social contract” that enables citizens to require 
certain actions from their government, for example, security and safety.  This, in 
turn, justifies a measure of power in the government to discharge these 
obligations.312  The social contract theory is said to provide a moral underpinning 
for governance authority because it evaluates the respective rights of citizens 
within the context of the duties owed to them by the state.313  However, we should 
be cautious about assuming the morality of “neutral” government policies as 
applied to particular groups, such as Native peoples, who are vulnerable to 
exploitation and harm by the dominant society.  In these cases, the morality of 
governance authority may depend upon whether the nation’s policies are truly fair 
and equal, or whether they disproportionately burden Native peoples or other 
vulnerable groups (women, the elderly, and children) in order to secure benefits for 
the dominant society.  
Furthermore, we should probe whether our existing social policies assign a 
“moral” value to human life, or a “monetary” value, as the government decides 
what level of remediation is sufficient.  If we assigned a “moral” value to human 
life, then each human life would be of equal and inviolate value, not to be 
outweighed by material economic considerations.  However, our social policy does 
not align with that intuition.  Naomi Zack discusses a 2008 decision by the EPA to 
revise its monetary evaluation of “an American human life from $7.8 to $6.9 
million.”314  The policy drew public controversy, but it was merely a statement of 
what was already in place.  The existing policy was too costly.  Naturally, “a lower 
value of statistical life permits spending less money on life-saving practices,” such 
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as the remediation of toxic and hazardous conditions.315  And what if the individual 
is deemed to have a “less useful” life, for example, because of age, infirmity, or 
“diminished capacity”?316  That life could have less value depending on whether the 
assumption of a statistical life is measured by the potential value that an 
individual places on her life or the value that society imagines her life has to others 
based on her individual capacities and potential.317 
As Zack demonstrates in the context of “disaster ethics,” there are many 
important moral considerations in constructing effective public policies to deal with 
remediation of environmental harm.  I would like to build on her insights and 
suggest that constructing an “ethics of remediation” will to some extent depend 
upon a shared understanding of the duties that pertain to the natural world, and 
those which govern human interactions.   Within the existing literature on ethics, 
the former set of questions is generally framed as “environmental ethics,” while the 
second set of questions is addressed as “environmental justice.”318  Within 
environmental ethics, there is a robust exchange as to whether we ought to value 
“nature” (absent human presence) for its own sake, or only because it serves 
human interests.  Within environmental justice, the discussion often revolves 
around notions of fairness and equality in the distribution of benefits and burdens 
within society, with special attention to disparities caused by economic deprivation 
or racial discrimination.  The literature on climate justice invokes both questions, 
as scholars attempt to discern which part of “climate change” is attributable to 
“natural phenomena,” and which part is anthropogenic. 
In building an “ethics of remediation” for the harms caused by radioactive 
contamination of Indigenous lands, I will argue that the standard utilitarian 
ethical approaches continue to obscure the problem.  For example, if a “national 
sacrifice area” can be justified by appeal to the greater “public good,” and if the 
“solution” is simply to assume the costs of relocating tribal members or providing a 
minimal standard of healthcare for those who become ill from the toxicity of the 
environment, then our account of reparative justice will merely replicate the 
standard tort model of compensatory justice that pertains to other categories of 
harm.   Under this model, monetary payments or other tangible benefits are 
perceived to “compensate” victims for the harm suffered.  However, if we accept the 
premise that traditional Indigenous value systems speak of a set of duties between 
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human beings and specific lands, then we must at least accord some moral value to 
those persons who continue to possess this knowledge and live by it.319  If these 
Indigenous, land-based communities are the ones suffering from the direct impacts 
of toxic contamination, then a simple appeal to “tribal sovereignty,” as the right of 
a current government to decide whether or not to engage in mining, is hardly an 
adequate principle to support an “ethics of remediation.”  In such a case, the tribal 
government may have a short-term economic incentive to authorize conduct that 
replicates past harms and causes cumulative toxic exposure to tribal members.  
The liability of the federal government for radioactive contamination is also 
potentially mitigated by the consent given by the tribal government for new 
mining on tribal lands. 
Rather, an “ethics of remediation” would arguably call for a study of the nature 
and extent of contamination of tribal lands and toxic exposure to tribal members, 
and then a concerted strategy and program to remediate the harm and protect 
human health.  In addition, it is arguable that the pressure exerted upon tribal 
governments by outside corporations or governments to develop energy reserves on 
tribal lands (designated as “tribal economic development”) is in fact coercive and 
exploitive, because it depends upon the fact that contemporary tribal governments 
often suffer from high levels of poverty and unemployment and do not have 
diversified economies that would support more sustainable forms of economic 
growth.  If the costs of remediation are in fact placed on the U.S. government and 
corporations that it licenses to mine uranium prior to any new development, there 
might be a different outcome.  However, it would also be unwise to condition 
remediation activities this way.  Rather, it may be that “moral repair” requires a 
commitment to build sustainable tribal economies, rather than encouraging 
destructive forms of development that jeopardize the long-term viability of tribal 
lands and the health of tribal members.320 
In the text that follows, I will first discuss the nature of remediation efforts on 
the Navajo Nation and demonstrate that the Navajo Nation is not being engaged 
as an equal sovereign within the politics of remediation for past harm.  I will then 
discuss the use of the international human rights forums by tribal members as a 
mechanism to engage in a public dialogue about radioactive contamination.  The 
latter effort is an exercise of “cultural sovereignty” by the affected community.321  
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This section of the article concludes by discussing human rights and remediation 
efforts in the South Pacific, which provide an instructive foundation for future 
work directed to creating an “ethics of remediation.” 
A. Domestic Law and Remediation Efforts on the Navajo Nation 
One of the most serious issues involves the effects of uranium mining on the 
health of tribal members.  This is an intergenerational issue, raising the need to 
study incidence of cancers, birth defects, and related health conditions (for 
example, hypertension, autoimmune diseases, and kidney disease).322  Church 
Rock is located between two former mining sites, and it is highly contaminated.  
The Northeast Church Rock mine was the largest uranium mine on the Navajo 
Nation, and significant amounts of radioactive waste are stored in the arroyo that 
runs through the community.323  To date, the EPA has only partially remediated 
lands in the vicinity of the mine by removing an 18-inch layer of topsoil on 
surrounding lands, but the full remediation of the mine is estimated to require at 
least until 2020 to complete.324  It will be very costly to remove the tailings, and it 
is unclear that there is another site to receive them.  The cost of the prospective 
remediation for the Northeast Church Rock site alone is estimated at $44 
million.325 
The tribal members living in this portion of the Church Rock chapter were 
relocated temporarily while the topsoil was removed, but most of the community 
members returned, claiming that they do not have anywhere else to go.326  The 
community was further split during the remediation process as some members 
were deemed eligible to be relocated because they lived in areas that were “highly 
contaminated,” while the level of contamination in other areas was determined to 
be “safe” for human habitation.  Those who resided on “contaminated lands” were 
offered a “permanent buyout” not to return, although there was no effort to find 
alternative lands for them.  Certain lands on top of the mesa are potentially open 
for settlement, but there are no roads or other infrastructure to enable this.  In 
addition, community members possess strong cultural views against leaving land 
where their umbilical cords are buried. 
In 2005, the State of New Mexico published water quality standards calling for 
the recognition of the public interest in maintaining health and safety in the state’s 
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water resources.327  After a challenge to the state law, the New Mexico Court of 
Appeals issued an opinion upholding the state’s determination.328  It is obvious 
that in this rural area, many people consume water from the wells, including 
pregnant women and those who are breastfeeding.  In addition, they eat livestock 
that drink the water and graze plants growing in the contaminated soil.  Although, 
the environmental health implications of this issue are profound, there does not 
appear to be a longitudinal study of the impacted population (some analysts say 
that the study population is too “small” to draw statistical inferences on causal 
factors for health conditions that might be associated with radioactive exposure).329  
Thus, the type of tracking that was done on South Pacific Island populations and 
on the survivors of Hiroshima appears to be unavailable for Navajo residents of the 
Church Rock chapter. 
In sum, the legal response to radioactive contamination of the Navajo Nation 
appears to be insufficient, at the very least.  There are two highly contaminated 
sites in this area, and there is currently no available site to dispose of the tailings 
permanently.  CERCLA’s emergency response program is a targeted remediation 
strategy that depends upon an “imminent and substantial endangerment 
standard.”330  Under this approach, the EPA sues potentially responsible parties 
(including federal agencies who were complicit in the contamination), and the 
Navajo Nation and Church Rock community are not direct parties in interest.  In 
fact, the Church Rock chapter does not even have a separate attorney to represent 
its interests.  Many of the uranium companies have now gone out of business, so 
the remaining parties, including the United States, have an incentive to reach a 
settlement for a fraction of the amount that it would take to truly “remediate” this 
area.  Absent adequate participation from the responsible parties, the federal 
government has considerable discretion in its decision-making about whether or 
not to conduct remediation on tribal lands.  For example, in El Paso Natural Gas 
Co. v. United States, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals refused to allow judicial 
review of the government’s decision not to remediate uranium contamination on 
the Navajo Nation under the Uranium Mill Tailings Remediation and Control Act, 
finding that this statute is designed to “protect public health in general, rather 
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than tribal health in particular.”331 
Clearly, the indicators are not positive for an approach that even remotely 
resembles an “ethics of remediation” on the Navajo Nation.  Given the 
shortcomings of domestic law, concerned residents have turned to international 
tribunals for assistance.  The next section of this paper examines the human rights 
approach to the “ethics of remediation.” 
B. Human Rights Cases 
Experts within the United Nations structure assert that, worldwide, Indigenous 
peoples have suffered a disproportionate share of the harms stemming from 
radioactive contamination.  In 2012, the United Nations Human Rights Council 
Special Rapporteur Calin Georgescu conducted a visit to the Marshall Islands and 
the United States to investigate environmental contamination, toxic waste, and 
other human rights issues arising from activities undertaken by the U.S. military 
in these areas.  Georgescu’s report, which was presented to the Human Rights 
Council in September 2012, documented the ongoing and extensive contamination 
in the Marshall Islands, and recommended a strategy for remediation.332  Professor 
S. James Anaya, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples also 
issued a report, finding that Indigenous peoples worldwide had suffered a 
disproportionate share of the harms of uranium mining, and this report was also 
presented to the Human Rights Council.333  The U.N. process facilitates deeper 
exploration of these issues than the domestic structures of the nation-states have 
allowed, and the Human Rights Council also invites the participation of NGO’s 
representing Indigenous peoples and women, who remain uniquely vulnerable to 
the harms of radioactive contamination.334 
Recently, a group of Navajo tribal members, organized as Eastern Dine Against 
Uranium Mining (EDAUM), took action to engage political redress for the harms of 
radioactive contamination on their lands, filing a petition in the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights within the Organization of American States.  In 
Eastern Navajo Dine Against Uranium Mining and Mitchell Capitan et al. v. 
United States, petitioners claim that acts and omissions of the United States that 
have “contaminated and will continue to contaminate natural resources in the 
Dine communities of Crownpoint and Church Rock” have violated petitioners’ 
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“human rights and breached its obligations under the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man.”335  The petition documents that petitioners have 
exhausted their legal remedies under domestic law, and that there are no 
additional avenues to challenge the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s grant of a 
license to HRI to mine uranium on lands within the Navajo Indian Country.336  
Petitioners assert that HRI’s plan to mine uranium using an ISL mining process 
threatens to contaminate the groundwater within this entire area.337  Church Rock 
and Crownpoint lie within the traditional use area of the Dine people, which sits 
within the Four Sacred Mountains that define the Dine territory.338  
According to the proposal that HRI submitted to the NRC, the company intends 
to develop four proposed mine sites within the extended territory of the Dine 
people—two within the Church Rock chapter and two within the Crownpoint 
chapter.  According to the petition, the uranium slurry that is “generated by the 
mining process will be processed at a central processing plant in Crownpoint.”339  
The target location for the central processing plant is in the middle of a Navajo 
community, within several hundred feet of homes inhabited by Navajo residents 
and near churches and community buildings where community members gather.  
Radon emissions from the processing plant are within a range which is likely to 
impair human health, and for this reason, this is not an activity that is typically 
found in residential areas.  The disregard for Navajo residents raises an 
environmental justice issue for the United States, and forms the core of the human 
rights complaint.  The petition is founded upon several human rights that are 
explicitly outlined in the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, 
including the right to life (inclusive of the right to a clean and healthy 
environment), the right to health, the right to property, and the right to cultural 
and religious integrity.”340 
If the United States decides to respond, it might assert that it already protects 
these rights under the “neutral” laws applicable to all citizens.  However, this 
claim is simply not true.  As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals noted, the laws of 
the United States governing radioactive waste are designed to protect “public 
health,” and not “tribal health.”341  Reservations are still treated like “public lands” 
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where “citizens” do not reside.  In addition, the unique cultural concerns of the 
Navajo people do not have a separate space within the discourse of remediation.  
As petitioners note, the communities of Church Rock and Crownpoint are within 
Dine Bikeyah, and they have profound spiritual and cultural importance to the 
Dine people.342  The Navajo families within these areas have been on the lands for 
generations.  They have buried the umbilical cords of each generation within the 
land, imparting a sacred and enduring bond between the people and Mother Earth.  
The people pray to the mountains each morning and live close to their relatives, 
practicing the ethical duties defined as “K’ei”—“which means you have respect for 
the deep bonds that exist between one another and that you carry out certain 
duties to each other.”343  The people in this area do not want to relocate to avoid 
the mining project, and they would lose their lands and lifeways if they are forced 
to relocate.  The traditional way of life includes raising sheep and other livestock, 
which are considered essential to the survival and health of the people.344  The 
water that sustains the community is also sacred and necessary for survival.  
Adopting an “intercultural approach” to the “ethics of remediation” requires 
according equal respect to the deeply held cultural views of the traditional Navajo 
people living within the Church Rock and Crownpoint chapters.  These 
communities practice the Dine philosophy encompassed within the phrase 
“sa’a’naghai bik ‘e hozho,” which imparts an ethics of “universal beauty, harmony 
and happiness.”345  Under this ethical view, to destroy a part of the natural world 
is to destroy one’s self.  The community believes that the destruction of water will 
disrupt the natural balance of things and create disharmony.  Under these 
teachings, the “corn pollen” embodies life and sustainability, while the yellow dust 
from the earth (uranium) is considered “a source of evil, best left within the 
ground.”346 
It is very likely that the ISL process of mining uranium will contaminate the 
community’s groundwater resources.  Uranium is immobile in an aquifer in its 
undisturbed state.  ISL mining involves establishing a series of injection and 
production wells throughout the area.  “Mining is conducted by injecting a solution 
of water, dissolved oxygen and sodium bicarbonate through injection wells and into 
the discrete areas of uranium mineralization known as ‘ore zones.’”347  The solution 
dissolves the ore zone and causes the uranium to become mobile in the aquifer.348  
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The production wells then pump the solution to the surface to process the 
uranium.349  There are cases from other jurisdictions, including Texas, 
documenting contamination of groundwater from ISL uranium mining.350  The 
potential for future contamination in an area already harmed by past mining 
practices is not supportable under principles of environmental justice or 
environmental ethics. 
In 2010, Phil Bluehouse, a member of the Dine Haatali (Navajo Medicine Men 
Association) and distinguished practitioner of Navajo peacemaking, initiated a 
peacemaking approach to the legacy of the Church Rock Spill.  Bluehouse 
facilitated a series of comprehensive planning workshops with representatives 
from the EPA, the Navajo EPA, and companies participating in the remediation 
effort.351  The federal process was beset with conflict, and community members felt 
that their experience, including the illnesses that they had experienced after the 
spill, were being ignored and minimized.352  The hope was that a cultural method 
of conflict resolution focused on “healing” and “creation narratives that correspond 
to [the] spiritual, psychological, and biophysical” needs of the people would 
promote a more comprehensive approach to remediation in a community that does 
not want to move from its traditional place.353 
Robert Yazzie, a Navajo jurist, educator, and policy analyst, has also endorsed 
an intercultural approach to remediation.354  Robert Yazzie, who served as the 
Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court for many years, proposed 
creating a “Navajo Uranium Commission” that would engage in a “Truth and 
Reconciliation Process.”355 This proposal inspired Navajo Nation President Ben 
Shelley to issue an Executive Order in 2012, authorizing this process to go forward, 
and the EPA provided initial support for a set of dialogues on remediation of 
radioactive contamination.356  In a public meeting, Navajo Tribal Council member 
George Arthur spoke of this effort as a form of reparations for Native Nations, 
comparing the movement with the U.S. effort to pay reparations for damages 
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caused by its bombing of Hiroshima.357 
The human rights and reparative justice approaches use intercultural norms to 
assess the nature of the costs and the objectives of “remediation.”  These 
approaches also counsel against further contamination in these areas, which 
continue to be the home of Indigenous peoples.  In comparison, the compensatory 
justice approach of the U.S. looks at contamination as a “past” issue that ought to 
be handled in a “cost-effective” manner.  This approach negates the important 
values held by Indigenous communities, as well as the legacy of their historical 
experience. 
The approach taken in the Marshall Islands provides an interesting comparison 
because the Compact focused on dissolving the Trust Territory and restoring the 
self-determination of the Pacific Island Nations, including restoration of their land 
base.  Although remediation in the Marshall Islands is not complete, the political 
approach seems more closely aligned with the needs of the Navajo Nation than 
with the standard “tort compensation model” that has traditionally been accorded 
to victims of government negligence or misfeasance. 
C. Indigenous Peoples and an “Ethics of Remediation” 
Building on the discussion of reparative justice outlined above, the starting 
point of building an “ethics of remediation” for Indigenous peoples should be the 
recognition that their unequal political status as “wards” allowed their exploitation 
and contamination of their lands and resources.  Special Rapporteur Georgescu 
emphasizes that this is the relevant context for remediation as a human rights 
claim in the South Pacific.358  His report details that the Compact actually 
reshaped the “trusteeship” to further the positive goals of the trust, namely: “(1) to 
secure self-government for the Marshall Islands; (2) to assist the Marshall Islands 
in its efforts toward attaining economic development and self-sufficiency; and (3) to 
ensure certain national security rights for all parties.”359  It is important to note 
that section 177(a) of the Compact specifically states that the U.S. “accepts 
responsibility for compensation owing to citizens of the Marshall Islands for loss or 
damage to property and person” that was caused by the U.S. nuclear testing 
program.360  Section 177(a) is the subject of another agreement that establishes a 
trust fund for economic assistance and compensation.361  In comparison, American 
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Indian nations are faced with the Supreme Court’s rulings that the “trust 
responsibility” is only enforceable if there is a legal cause of action.362  This 
principle now allows the United States to disregard its moral responsibility to “set 
things right,” which is the operative principle of an “ethics of remediation.”   
In the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, the United States Congress 
apologized to specified victims of radioactive contamination, including those who 
lived downwind of the nuclear weapons testing sites in Nevada, Utah, and Arizona, 
as well as uranium miners and their families, “for the hardships they have 
endured.”363  There was no similar apology to the Navajo Nation or any other 
Nation whose lands, citizens, and resources were harmed.  In some sense, the 
Congressional hearings that led up to RECA and its amendments were a form of 
“truth-telling,” allowing the Navajo miners and other victims to share their 
experiences.  However, years later, these hearings are ghostly vestiges of the 
“past.”  No one focuses on the current and continuing harms faced by the Navajo 
people who still live in the areas of the reservation that were heavily mined, 
including Tuba City, Shiprock, Church Rock, and Crownpoint.  Nor is there a 
public monument that details the number of human lives that were sacrificed for 
the “public good” of national security. 
Rather, the U.S. government has approached the question of remediation from 
the perspective of what is cost-effective.  It is not cost-effective to remove all topsoil 
to remediate all of the contaminated lands on the Navajo Nation or the Island 
Nations, nor is it cost-effective to remove the huge pilings of tailings, given the lack 
of any available site to store nuclear waste.  In this respect, the “acts of redress” 
fall short of the desired outcome.  Similarly, compensation is generally paid at the 
individual level rather than the group level under domestic law.  This is where the 
Special Rapporteur’s report for the Marshall Islands is very instructive. 
Georgescu’s report states that the U.S. nuclear testing program “resulted in 
both immediate and continuing effects on the human rights of the Marshallese,” 
specifically those linked to human health and environmental contamination.364  
The report documents the fatalities and serious illnesses that have occurred among 
the Marshallese people and finds that the radioactive contamination has violated 
their human right to health.365  In addition, the Marshallese people were displaced 
from their homes and many were subjected to public and humiliating 
examinations.  For example, several Marshallese women testified that they were 
forced to strip naked in front of others so that radioactive emissions from their 
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bodies could be measured by a Geiger counter, and that they faced cultural stigmas 
from such treatment.366  The Marshallese suffered severe cultural impacts from 
being removed from their traditional lands and cultural lifeways, and the 
appropriation of lands was particularly severe for Marshallese women, who are the 
custodians of land under customary law.367  Thus, the consequences of the United 
States’ policies in the South Pacific not only affected the health of the people and 
their environment, but also imposed severe cultural harms, including particular 
harms for Marshallese women that have continuing impacts. 
Significantly, the Special Rapporteur looked to Article 26 of the Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which describes the rights of Indigenous peoples 
to their traditional lands and territories as a way to prompt the United States to 
engage in a dialogue about the unresolved land issues.368  The report also looks at 
Article 28, which speaks to the need to hold consultations with Indigenous peoples 
to determine what is adequate redress for the loss, and to consider all available 
alternatives, including restitution of land, where possible, and if that is not 
possible, “just, fair and equitable compensation.”369 
Given the serious and on-going consequences of radioactive contamination in 
the Pacific, the Special Rapporteur specifically engages the issue of reparations by 
endorsing “a comprehensive approach incorporating the full range of judicial and 
non-judicial measures, including, among others, individual prosecutions, 
reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, or an appropriately conceived 
combination thereof, in order to, inter alia, ensure accountability, service justice, 
provide remedies to victims, promote healing and reconciliation.”370  The main 
emphasis of this program of reparations is directed at the health impacts, 
including an examination of whether the United States specifically used the 
Marshallese as “human subjects” to assess the effects of nuclear weapons on 
human beings.371  Although the U.S. Advisory Committee on Human Radiation 
Experiments disclaimed such intentional conduct, the Special Rapporteur’s report 
details the unethical aspects of U.S. programs and the enduring “legacy of distrust” 
that they created.”372 
The report concludes by recounting existing efforts by the U.S. Department of 
Energy to remediate the contaminated lands around village housing and 
agricultural areas, as well as sampling of commonly consumed foods to assess the 
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risk of exposure.373  Both issues are critically important to the future of the 
Marshallese people.  In addition, the Special Rapporteur noted that some military 
sites containing radioactive waste are not being well maintained and pose a 
significant threat.374  The report recommends a comprehensive terrestrial and 
marine survey that can identify and map the sites where toxic and radiogenic 
substances remain from U.S. military activity on the Marshall Islands.375 
The approach taken by the Special Rapporteur provides an excellent template 
for what should occur in the United States in relation to radioactive contamination 
of tribal lands.  It is important for the United States to assume responsibility as a 
trustee for the harms that occurred in the past, as well as for the continuing 
consequences of those harms for human health and the environment on 
reservation lands and on lands adjacent to the reservation where tribal members 
live.  The United States ought to invoke the provisions of the Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples to identify the rights of Native people to their lands, 
territories, and resources, and to their right to have a standard of health that is 
equivalent to that of other citizens.  Without studying the nature and extent of the 
contamination and its impacts on human health, this will not be possible.  
Moreover, the United States should focus on remediation, rather than on 
encouraging companies to develop uranium resources in areas that are already so 
badly contaminated that tribal members are exposed to radiation levels 
significantly higher than the maximums permissible under federal law. 
This strategy will likely require institutional restructuring because the federal 
courts have been very reluctant to impose liability upon the United States or 
constrain the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from approving new mining 
projects.376  The efforts in the United States and the Marshall Islands should 
involve effective and meaningful consultation about the nature and extent of the 
contamination, as well as about the desired outcomes for remediation.  The 
consultation process should be intercultural, allowing the Navajo people and other 
Indigenous Nations to detail the harms that they have suffered and what they 
require for remediation of these harms. 
In sum, an “ethics of remediation” should be based on a platform of mutual 
respect, honoring Indigenous self-determination and the protective aspects of the 
federal trust responsibility.  It is necessary to build new institutions and develop 
intercultural norms of justice that can offer effective redress for past harms and 
restructure current relationships to facilitate human health and environmental 
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This article has explored the past and present context of radioactive 
contamination of Native peoples and lands, and has attempted to construct the 
outlines of an “ethics of remediation.”  As we move forward in the era of climate 
change, we will see increasing pressure to develop uranium as “green energy.”  
This use of political rhetoric may obscure the grave consequences of uranium 
mining to Native people, their lands, livestock, and water resources.  The Navajo 
Nation has banned uranium mining within the Navajo Indian Country, and the 
Navajo Nation Council has rescinded the earlier approval for a “demonstration 
uranium recovery project” on Navajo land.  However, ISL uranium development on 
fee lands outside the reservation continues under the control of state and federal 
licensing agencies.   
The Navajo Nation’s ban on uranium mining appears to resonate with the 
decision of Pacific Island nations to declare the South Pacific a “nuclear-free zone” 
and to demand reparations for the harms caused by the nation-states who used 
this area for bomb testing.  In comparison, the 2013 vote of the Navajo legislators 
could reflect a sense of fatalism or powerlessness, given that the NRC has licensed 
new ISL mining in this region, that the remediation of past harm is far from 
complete, and that the “checkerboard land” status has limited effective regulatory 
authority by the Navajo Nation.  The Navajo Nation’s ban on uranium mining and 
current legislative action appear to be a true exercise of “self-determination,” and 
yet, it may be the case that the Navajo Nation lacks the authority under current 
law to adequately protect its lands, resources, and tribal members, or to demand 
effective reparation for past contamination.   
In closing, I would like to reflect on a powerful insight shared by Martin 
Wagner, an attorney with Earth Justice and one of the keynote speakers at the 
Santa Clara Symposium on Human Rights and the Environment.  He spoke of his 
work on behalf of the Inuit and related a comment by Inuit leader, Sheila Watt-
Cloutier, who said that the Inuit human rights petition filed in the Organization of 
American States against the United States for the harms of climate change was 
designed to show the world what was really happening.  The will to continue a 
traditional way of life exists at the level of the heart, he said, while the legal claim 
is constructed at the level of the mind.  Too often, the law abstracts the “heart” out 
of the claim, leaving only the bare intellectual outline of a claim for “damages.”  In 
this sense, the human rights petition served the interests of the affected Inuit 
people to highlight continuing wrongs at a global level despite the likelihood of 
ever recovering any “damages” against the United States.  This is very consistent 
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with the petition that ENDAUM has filed against the United States for the 
continuing harms of radioactive contamination on the Navajo Nation’s traditional 
territory.   
On the Navajo Nation and in the Pacific Islands, the claims for remediation 
engage the need to repair the damage caused by past policies that are now seen as 
“wrong” but have been justified by the United States as necessary to serve the 
“public good” at the time that they occurred.  Similarly, the current initiative to 
conduct ISL mining within the Navajo Indian Country seeks to serve the energy 
needs of the public, at the expense of the Navajo communities who live on these 
lands.  The rhetoric of a “vulnerable population” is insufficient to gain redress for 
past wrongs or to stop the continuing harms.  We must recast the claims of 
Indigenous communities in the form of self-determination, appreciating the unity 
of land, community, and culture that provides the nexus for this moral and 
political right. 
When we consider the question of justice, we often ask whether there is a “fair” 
distribution of goods and harms.377  In the area of nuclear energy, the public good 
is constructed at the cost of placing the harms upon Indigenous peoples.  This 
constitutes environmental injustice, and possibly a form of environmental racism 
that negates the equal dignity of Indigenous peoples by sacrificing their health and 
well-being for the good of the majority society. 
An additional problem to consider is that of “epistemic injustice.”378  Science 
policy continues to determine what a “safe” level of contamination is and what 
acceptable technologies for mining are.  The dominant society also constructs the 
legal framework that governs redress for harm, mainly as a tort cause of action for 
specific, proven physical and tangible injuries.  Indigenous peoples are excluded 
from participation in generating these policies, and so they become victims of the 
policy, whether this is acknowledged or not.  The relevant legal framework under 
domestic law omits the experience of harm as spiritual and cultural, which is a 
form of “hermeneutical injustice.”379  It also omits the testimony of Indigenous 
community members as “experts” in favor of scientific and economic accounts of 
harm, which constitutes a form of “testimonial injustice.”380 
In constructing an “ethics of remediation,” it is necessary to engage these 
disparate accounts of injustice and to invoke Indigenous norms in the service of 
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building a more inclusive and balanced approach to the issue of radioactive 
contamination of Indigenous peoples and lands.  The human rights approach 
illuminates the moral, legal, and political issues at the level of “heart” and “mind,” 
evoking the actual experience of the communities that suffer from the politics 
surrounding nuclear energy development and remediation efforts.  As Martin 
Wagner noted, “what we fail to understand, we destroy.”  This is the common 
lesson of the case studies presented in this article, and it serves as an enduring 
challenge for every government. 
